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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Federal Income Taxation-The Ups and Downs of the Education
Expense Deduction
INTRODUCTION
Each year an increasing number of men and women in the United
States are returning to college or business school in order to improve
themselves in their chosen field of endeavor or to fulfill a requirement
of their employer. Under the present Treasury regulations1 some
are allowed to deduct the costs of this additional education as an
"ordinary and necessary" expense incurred in the carrying on of their
trade or business, while others are not. Because of the close line
which has been drawn, it is often difficult for a taxpayer to decide if
his educational expenses fall into the deductible or non-deductible
category.2
The objective of this discussion is to trace the development of the
education expense deduction and to look at the present day applica-
tion of the so-called "liberalized" regulations' by the Internal Revenue
Service and our courts.
THE HILL CASE
Prior to 1950 there was virtually no deduction for education
expenses except in fringe areas.4 These deductions were disallowed
by the courts on the ground of being either personal expenses5 or
'Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5 (1958).
2 Generally the costs incurred for undergraduate college education and
basic professional training have never been deductible, and this comment is
not a discussion of this point. See Louis Aronin, 30 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 993
(1961); Knut F. Larson, 15 T.C. 956 (1950); Lewis v. Commissioner, 8
T.C. 770, af'd, 164 F.2d 885 (2d Cir. 1947); T. F. Driscoll, 4 B.T.A.
1008 (1926); J. D. Bowles, 1 B.T.A. 584 (1925). But ef. Michaelson v.
United States, 203 F. Supp. 830 (D. Wash. 1961), aff'd, 313 F.2d 668 (9th
Cir. 1963).
' Supra note 1.
" Alexander Silverman, 6 B.T.A. 1328 (1927) (college chemistry depart-
ment head allowed deduction for attending scientific convention); Marion D.
Shutter, 2 B.T.A. 23 (1925). Physicians were allowed to deduct expenses
incurred while attending meetings and conventions of medical societies, but
there is no definite indication that they were of an educational nature. See
Robert C. Coffey, 21 B.T.A. 1242 (1931); Cecil M. Jack, 13 B.T.A. 726
(1928).
'James M. Osborn, 3 T.C. 603 (1944) (no deduction allowed professor
for doing scholarly research); T. F. Driscoll, 4 B.T.A. 1008 (1926) (no
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non-depreciable assets.6
The first significant break-through in this area came in the case
of Nora Payne Hill.7  The taxpayer was a school teacher who was
required by state law to renew her teaching certificate every ten years.
In order to meet this requirement she had to pass an examination on
five books or complete three hours of college credit in courses which
were acceptable to the school board. She chose the latter. This
choice did not increase her salary since she was already receiving
the maximum allowed. The taxpayer claimed a deduction for the
expenses which she incurred on account of attending college.8  She
argued that the expenses were ordinary and necessary expenses in-
curred in conducting her trade or business as a teacher in the public
schools. She contended that the additional education made it possible
for her to meet the requirements of the state law regarding renewal
of her teaching certificate and helped her to sharpen the tools of her
trade, i.e., to maintain, not to better, the status which she had already
achieved.
The Commissioner contended that the costs incurred by the tax-
payer were personal in nature and not "ordinary and necessary"'
business expenses. He relied on a 1921 Office Decision,1 0 stating
that costs incurred by teachers attending summer school were per-
sonal and non-deductible, and on the Treasury regulations then in
force. 1
deduction for voice lessons anticipating professional engagements); Jay N.
Darling, 4 B.T.A. 499 (1926) (no deduction allowed cartoonist for incidental
expenses while studying sculpturing).
The Commissioner acquiesced in this position at all times. O.D. 984, 5
Cum. BULL. 171 (1921) (expenses incurred by doctors in taking post-
graduate courses are personal); O.D. 892, 4 Cumv. BULL. 209 (1921) (ex-
penses of teachers attending summer school are personal). See also Treas.
Reg. 111, §29.23(a)-15(b) (1943); Treas. Reg. 103, §19.23(a)-15(b)
(1940).
'This idea came about by way of dictum in Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S.
111 (1933), where Justice Cardozo said: "Reputation and learning are akin to
capital assets,.... .For many, they are the only tools with which to hew a
pathway to success. The money spent in acquiring them is well and wisely
spent. It is not an ordinary expense of the operation of a business." Id. at
115-16.
13 T.C. 291 (1949).
'The deduction claimed was for room rent, traveling expense, tuition, and
the estimated difference between cost of living at school and at home.
° For good discussions of the legal definition of an "ordinary" expense see
Deputy v. DuPont, 308 U.S. 488, 495-96 (1940); Welch v. Helvering, 290
U.S. 111, 114 (1933).
" O.D. 892, 4 Cum. BULL. 209 (1921).
"
1Treas. Reg. 111, §29.23(a)-15(b) (1943).
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The Tax Court held for the Commissioner. The court stated that
the taxpayer had not overcome the presumptively correct determina-
tion by the Commissioner that the expense was a personal one. The
inference was made that since the taxpayer's certificate had expired
she might not have been "employed" at the time she took the summer
school courses, but rather incurred the expense to qualify for re-
employment. The court also stated that for an expense to be
"ordinary" it must be one of common or frequent occurrence in the
particular occupation. In this instance it could not be assumed that
teachers ordinarily attend summer school to obtain a renewal of their
certificates when another method was available, i.e., passing an
examination on five books.
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed.'" The court said
that "clearly, the very logic of the situation here shows that she went
to Columbia to maintain her present position, not to attain a new
position; to preserve, not to expand or increase; to carry on, not to
commence. Any other view seems to us unreal and hypercritical."'
3
Thus, as a result of Hill, deductions for educational expenses
were allowed if the education was undertaken to enable the taxpayer
to meet a requirement necessary for the maintenance of his present
position. However, once it appeared that the taxpayer was seeking
to attain a new position, the deduction was to be disallowed.
THE TREND FOLLOWING HILL
After Hill the Commissioner promulgated I.T. 4044's which
modified the old 1921 Office Decision and allowed Hill to be followed
where the facts were similar. This ruling stated that where a
teacher incurred expenses in order to maintain her position, they
would be deductible as ordinary and necessary business expenses.
However, where the expenses were "incurred for the purpose of ob-
taining a teaching position, or qualifying for permanent status, a
higher position, an advance in the salary schedule, or to fulfill the
general cultural aspirations of the teacher,"' 5 they will be deemed
personal expenses and not deductible.
In Manoel Cardozo'0 the Tax Court was called on to apply the
guidelines set out in Hill and in I.T. 4044. Here, the taxpayer, a
'2 Hill v. Commissioner, 181 F.2d 906 (4th Cir. 1950).
Id. at 909. (Emphasis added.)1951-1 CuM. BULL. 16.
1 Id. at 17.
1o17 T.C. 3 (1951).
19631
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university professor, took a trip to Europe for the purpose of study
and research. It was not necessary for him to take this trip in order
to retain his position at the university. Indeed, the petitioner himself
contended that the trip was undertaken to better equip himself to
perform the duties of his present employment, to increase his prestige,
and to attract opportunities in the fields of scholarship and education
by improving his reputation for scholarship and learning. The court
stated that neither Hill nor I.T. 4044 would allow the deduction
asked for by the taxpayer.1 7 The fact was stressed that Hill required
the taxpayer to incur the expenses either to maintain, preserve, or
carry on his present position. Since the taxpayer in this instance was
not required to make the trip for any of these purposes, the deduction
was not allowed."8
In George G. Coughlin.'9 the petitioner was an attorney who
handled tax matters in the course of his general practice. He claimed
a business expense deduction for expenses incurred while attending
the New York University Institute on Federal Taxation. The Tax
Court denied the deduction because the taxpayer's objective was of
a personal nature. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals in re-
versing2° indicated that the situation presented was analogous to Hill.
" Neither is a deduction allowed in connection with travel and study ex-
penses incurred by a teacher on sabbatical leave unless the undertaking is
required by the school for the maintenance of the teacher's position. Rev.
Rul. 55-412, 1955 Cum. BuLL. 318.
"In Knut F. Larson, 15 T.C. 956, 958 (1950), the taxpayer agreed that
the studies for which the deduction was claimed increased his earning capacity,
and this, said the court, was enough to distinguish the case from Hill.
The court said: "Thus, whether the expenses were undertaken as purely per-
sonal matters to improve petitioner's education and cultural attainments or in
order to achieve improvement in his professional status ... the result would
be identical."
See Samuel W. Marshall, Jr., 24 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 797 (1955), where
the deduction was disallowed for music lessons to qualify the taxpayer for
a position as a music teacher. This question was not raised on appeal.
240 F.2d 185 (5th Cir. 1957). In Rhonda Fennell, 22 P-H Tax Ct. Mem.
460 (1953), a deduction was allowed for expenses incurred by a librarian
who, because of a ruling made by the Tennessee State Board of Education,
had to have additional credits in library science courses to retain her position
when the school in which she was employed exceeded a certain average daily
attendance. See also Richard Henry Lampkin, 21 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 507
(1952) (no deduction allowed for expenses incurred in connection with a
doctor's dissertation); Fred A. DeCain, 20 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 535 (1951)
(no deduction for trips of an educational nature).
18 T.C. 528 (1952). Four judges dissented without opinion.
Co G ughlin v. Commissioner, 203 F.2d 307 (2d Cir. 1953). Also see
Anthony E. Spitaleri, 32 T.C. 988 (1959) (no deduction for expenses in-
curred by a practicing accountant to take a law school correspondence
[Vol. 41
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The court felt that the only difference between the two cases was
in the degree of necessity which prompted the incurrence of the
expenditures. The court stated:
It was a way well adapted to fulfill his professional duty to
keep sharp the tools he actually used in his going trade or
business. It may be that the knowledge he thus gained inci-
dentally increased his fund of learning in general and, in that
sense, the cost of acquiring it may have been a personal ex-
pense; but . . . the immediate, over-all professional need to
incur the expenses in order to perform his work with due
regard to the current status of the law so overshadows the
personal aspect that it is the decisive feature.2'
In Robert M. Kamins" the taxpayer, who had been hired as an
instructor by a university on a year to year basis, attempted to
deduct a portion of the cost of getting a doctorate degree. The under-
standing between the taxpayer and his employer was that he would
substantially complete his qualifications for a doctorate degree before
a permanent contract of employment would be offered. Nevertheless,
the taxpayer was appointed to a permanent position before com-
pleting the necessary prerequisite. In arguing for the allowance
of the deduction, the taxpayer contended that he was in fact "main-
taining" his position as set forth in Hill and I.T. 4044, and that the
requirement of completing his doctorate was a condition subsequent
to the attaining of the teaching position. The Tax Court disallowed
the deduction. In its opinion it referred to a letter from a university
official which stated that the degree was essential to the retention
of the position. The court stated that even though the taxpayer was
hired on a permanent basis before completion of his work, still,
he was not fully and completely established in his chosen profession
until he attained the doctorate degree. On this latter ground the
case was distinguished from Hill.2"
course); Musser v. United States, 1957-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 1 9603 (N.D.
Cal.) (deduction allowed for expenses incurred in attending a professional
seminar).21 Coughlin v. Commissioner, 203 F.2d 307, 309 (2d Cir. 1953).2225 T.C. 1238 (1956).
" In Richard Seibold, 31 T.C. 1017 (1959), both husband and wife were
school teachers. The husband held a permanent certificate permitting him
to teach music, and his wife held a temporary certificate to teach the same
subject. Both taxpayers took a European trip which included a two week
course at the University of Geneva. The husband did not attend the course
but was given two hours of credit toward his inservice requirement upon the
19631
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In Clark S. Marlor24 the petitioner was hired as a tutor by the
Board of Education of New York City. The board had a rule which
provided that a tutor who did not meet the requirements for the
position of instructor within five years from the date of his appoint-
ment would neither be eligible for promotion to the rank of instructor
nor eligible for reappointment as a tutor. To meet this requirement
a tutor had to demonstrate substantial progress toward a Ph.D.
degree. In 1952 the petitioner claimed a deduction for expenses in-
curred in progressing towards his Ph.D. and contended that he in-
curred the expenses to retain his position as a tutor. The Tax Court,
with three judges dissenting, upheld the Commissioner's contention
that he expended the money in order to qualify himself for a higher
rank. The dissent expressed the position that the expenditures were
made for a dual purpose, i.e., to qualify for a permanent position
and to retain his temporary appointment, with the latter of the ob-
jectives being the more immediate. Thus, the petitioner's position is
supported by Hill. In a per curiam reversal, the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals said it agreed in all respects with the dissenting
opinion of the Tax Court.25
submission by him of a detailed report indicating the places he visited on
the trip and his ideas of the benefits he attained from the trip. The Tax
Court in rejecting the deduction of the husband's expenses said that this was
merely a sightseeing trip and was not an "ordinary" way for a teacher to
earn credit hours towards a requirement even though it was a permissible
way. The court also pointed out that he did not take the trip essentially to
secure the credits since he could have gotten three times the number of credit
hours allowed him for no additional cost simply by attending the course at
Geneva University. The wife attained six hours of credit by attending the
course at Geneva, and she later went on to attain additional credits which
together with the credits received at Geneva allowed her to obtain a perma-
nent teaching certificate. In denying the deduction both for the trip to
Geneva and the additional costs incurred in attaining the certificate, the
court said she made the expenditures in order to acquire a position which
she had never held before, i.e., a permanent one. For this reason the court
indicated that her situation was analogous to that of the taxpayer in Kamitts
and not Hill as was contended.
' 27 T.C. 624 (1956).
" Marlor v. Commissioner, 251 F.2d 615 (2d Cir. 1958). In Robert S.
Green, 28 T.C. 1154 (1957), a deduction was allowed where the taxpayer
was required by the local board of education to take additional college
courses to maintain her advanced standing. The court was unconcerned with
the fact that the taxpayer combined these courses with others in later
obtaining a masters degree which led to a pay raise.
In Bistline v. United States, 145 F. Supp. 802 (D. Idaho 1956), the
taxpayer was allowed a $435.20 deduction on his 1948 return for unreimbursed
travel expenses, hotel costs, and costs for tuition and books to attend a two
week course in federal taxation in New York City. The issue of this de-
duction was not raised on appeal. 260 F.2d 80 (9th Cir. 1958).
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THE NEW REGULATIONS UNDER THE 1954 CODE
The discussion up to this point has involved only cases which
arose under the 1939 Code. With the enactment of the 1954 Code,
a change took place in the education expense deduction area.
To understand the reason for the change which occurred, we
must look to the Commissioner's new regulations. 6 This set of
regulations was promulgated in 1958 and made to apply retroactively
to all 1954 Code years.2 7  They came about mainly as a result of
pressure being put on Congress for legislative action in this area.28
At the time of their promulgation, a bill, extremely liberal in nature
(although affecting only teachers), was pending before Congress.29
When the Treasury Department announced the new regulations, the
sponsor of the pending legislation stated that they obviated the
necessity of enacting his bill.3 ' These regulations were hailed as a
"liberalization" of the policy governing education expenses, and it
was estimated by the National Education Association that they would
save teachers alone $20 million annually.3 '
These regulations provide in part as follows:
(a) Expenditures made by a taxpayer for his education are
deductible if they are for education (including research activi-
ties) undertaken primarily for the purpose of:
(1) Maintaining or improving skills required by the
taxpayer in his employment or other trade or business, or
(2) Meeting the express requirements of a taxpayer's
employer, or the requirements of applicable law or regulations,
imposed as a condition to the retention by the taxpayer of his
salary, status or employment.
As we shall see, the genuine "liberalization" which the taxpayers
expected from these regulations was not to be forthcoming. Instead,
2
'Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5 (1959).
'Technical Amendments Act of 1958, § 96, 72 Stat. 1606, 1672.
'
8 NEA News Bulletin, May 1958, p. 13, col. 2.
20 H.R. 4662, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957). This proposed legislation
would have allowed a teacher to deduct expenses paid during the taxable
year for the furtherance of his education. This deduction would have been
limited to $600 per annum and would have been a deduction from adjusted
gross income. Such a deduction was not to be allowed under this section if
it was allowable as a trade or business expense deduction under Section
162 of the 1954 Code.
o NEA News Bulletin, supra note 28.
'l Ibid.
"Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5(a) (1959).
1963] 833:
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due to the Commissioner's strict and narrow construction of these
innovations, the question of educational expenses has become one
of the more litigated in the federal income tax field.
THE INITIAL INTERPRETATION OF THE NEw REGULATIONS
John S. Watson33 was the first case to arise under these new regu-
lations. The taxpayer, a physician who specialized in internal
medicine, used "psychosomatic medicine" in his practice. After
practicing for a few years, he decided to obtain further training in
psychiatry. The training was undertaken on a completely volun-
tary basis and did not lead to any additional degree or certificate.
The taxpayer contended that it would enable him to do a better job of
practicing internal medicine. The Commissioner in contesting the
deduction allowance argued that the taxpayer had not proven it to
be customary34 for a specialist of internal medicine to undertake a
course of this type.
The Tax Court in allowing the deduction"' stated that it was not
absolutely necessary for the taxpayer to show that such training was
customary. Instead, the court felt that the emphasis should be placed
on the primary purpose of the additional education. The court stated:
Though the course was specialized, petitioner was not pur-
suing it for the purpose of fitting himself to engage in the
specialty. He continued to practice as an internist but with
skills presumably sharpened by his additional training in
analysis and psychiatric techniques. 6
Less than a year later Arnold Namrow,37 one of the leading cases
in this area, came before the Tax Court. The two petitioners were
engaged in the practice of psychiatry. They enrolled in a psycho-
analytic institute for training in the practice and theory of psycho-
analysis. In addition to tuition and fees, they incurred expenditures
for a personal analysis and for the services of a supervising analyst.
The petitioners contended that this additional training was pri-
marily undertaken to improve their skills as psychiatrists and should
be deductible as a business expense. The Commissioner argued that
3 31 T.C. 1014 (1959).
' This is the guideline set forth in Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5(a) (1958).
s Four judges dissented without opinion.
3631 T.C. 1014, 1016 (1959). The court says the taxpayer comes under
example (2) of Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5(e) (1959).
37 33 T.C. 419 (1959).
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psychoanalysis is a medical specialty and not merely a technique of
psychiatric therapy and, therefore, the taxpayers were obtaining a new
specialty. A majority of the court disallowed the deduction and
stated that "the purpose of their attendance... was to obtain a new
or substantial advancement in position and the training they were
undertaking ... was to satisfy the minimum requirements for each
petitioner to establish himself as a practitioner in the special tech-
flique of psychoanalysis." 38 The court pointed out that each student
at the institute promised not to hold himself out as a psychoanalyst
until so authorized by the institute and that most of the patients which
the taxpayers would treat by use of psychoanalysis would be re-
ferrals from colleagues at the institute. Thus, it would be unlikely
for a psychiatrist to establish a psychoanalytic practice unless he
attended the institute.
Five judges dissented on the ground that the facts showed
psychoanalysis to be merely an intensive form of psychotherapy, the
most common form of treatment used by psychiatrists. The dissent-
ing judges felt that the expenses were incurred by the taxpayers to
maintain or improve their skills required in the practice of psychiatry
rather than to obtain a new specialty."9
The disallowance of the deduction was affirmed by the Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals40 on the ground that the findings of the Tax
Court were not so clearly erroneous as to compel a reversal.4" The
court rationalized that the true purpose and effect of an expense
governs its deductibility,4" and the court felt that the taxpayers ex-
pended money and time in order to secure recognition in the eyes of
their professional brethren as competent psychoanalysts. However,
8 1 d. at 434. The majority rejected the argument that the payments made
for services of supervising analysts were in effect consultation fees. They
held that these fees were incurred as a part of the required supervised clinical
work of the institute and any benefit which the patient received from them
was incidental.
" The dissenters would allow the deduction of the fees paid for super-
vising analysts as ordinary and necessary business expenses regardless of
whether or not all the expenses are deductible education costs.
"' Namrow v. Commissioner, 288 F.2d 648 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 368
U.S. 914 (1961). For a more recent case in accord where the taxpayer was
both a practicing psychiatrist and part-time teacher of psychiatry, see Grant
R. Gilmore, 38 T.C. No. 76 (1962).
"' Where there is sufficient evidence to support the lower court's position,
it will not be reversed unless the findings of fact are clearly untenable and
erroneous. See Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278, 290-91 (1960);
United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948).
" Weiss v. Steam, 265 U.S. 242 (1924).
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while of no monetary benefit to the taxpayers, the court did conclude
that "the basic question of fact, whether psychoanalysis requires the
acquisition of a new skill or the improvement of one already pos-
sessed, still remains to be answered . . . ."" Thus, the result seems
to rest upon the fact that psychoanalysis is in effect regarded as a
specialty "by a large body of medical opinion without whose approval
it cannot be successfully practiced."44
Upon an examination of Watson and Namrow, a distinction,
though narrow in scope, can be seen. If the taxpayer is felt by
the court to be "running in place," i.e., maintaining his present
position, the deduction will be allowed. On the other hand, if the
court feels he has "taken a step upwards," i.e., obtained a new and
superior position, the deduction will be disallowed.
This distinction, although in line with the rule of Hill, appears
unharmonious with the supposed liberalization of the education ex-
pense deduction. When the new regulations were promulgated, the
Treasury Department reportedly stated that the new ruling would
cover the "cost of courses taken to keep one's skills on a par with
those of colleagues and competitors . . . ."" This seems to recognize
the fact that in our modern day society a person cannot remain static
upon attaining the minimum requirements in his chosen occupation.
He must be constantly improving his knowledge, understanding, and
ability in his field of endeavor in order to keep up with changing
conditions. It appears that neither the Commissioner nor the courts
are adequately recognizing this factor in their application of the
regulations.
Also, when appraising this area of the tax law, it must be kept
in mind that most of the claims for deduction will be for relatively
small amounts, and the taxpayers will, in most instances, contest the
non-allowance of the deduction, if at all, without legal counsel. 40
Thus, the Commissioner's harsh application of his regulations and
288 F.2d 648, 652 (4th Cir. 1961).
"Id. at 653. The contention that the expenses were deductible as medi-
cal expenses was rejected unanimously by both the Tax Court and the
appellate tribunal.
"New York Times, April 4, 1958, p. 23, col. 8.
' The deduction is further minimized if the taxpayer is an employee as
distinguished from a self-employed individual. In the case of an employee,
the education expense deduction will be a deduction from adjusted gross
income and can be claimed only if the taxpayer does not elect the standard
deduction. See Hartrick v. United States, 205 F. Supp. 111 (N.D. Ohio
1962); William E. Thompson, 26 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 229 (1957).
[Vol. 41
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the strict view of the courts as exemplified by Namrow are making
it extremely difficult for the deduction to receive widespread use.
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
From 1960 to the present, cases in this area have been coming
before the courts in rapid succession. In some cases it has been clear
that the taxpayer had incurred a non-deductible expense.47 In
other instances the courts have adhered to the so-called "liberal
spirit" of the regulations and have allowed the deduction.4 s How-
"In Bernd W. Sandt, 30 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 997 (1961), af'd, 303 F.2d
111 (3d Cir. 1962) and Roger A. Hines, 30 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1123 (1961),
aff'd, 303 F.2d 111 (3d Cir. 1962) the petitioners were research chemists.
They were promised jobs as patent chemists if they obtained a legal education.
The court reasoned that the primary purpose of the additional education was
to obtain a new position, and on this ground the deduction was denied.
It has been held that where government employees hold jobs which do
not require legal training, expenses incurred in obtaining a law degree will
not be allowed as a deduction. See James J. Engel, 31 P-H Tax Ct. Mem.
1441 (1962); Louis Aronin, 30 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 993 (1961).
See also Soloman Diamond, 1963 P-H TAX CT. REP. & MEM. DEC. (32
P-H Tax Ct. Mem.) 63, 037; Ansis Mitrevics, 1963 P-H TAX CT. REP. &
MEM. DEC. (32 P-H Tax Ct. Mem.) § 63, 067; Frederick T. Simon, 31 P-H
Tax Ct. Mem. 1072 (1962); Maude A. Schinnagel, 31 P-H Tax Ct. Mem.
638 (1962); James J. Condit, 31 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1446 (1962); Daniel
Kates, 31 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1545 (1962); Morris S. Schwartz, 30 P-H
Tax Ct. Mem. 795 (1961).
8 In Woodward W. Hartrick, 1963 P-H CT. REP. & MEM. DEC. (32
P-H Tax Ct. Mem.) 63,036, the taxpayer held a provisional teaching cer-
tificate and took courses to get the certificate renewed as required by the
school board. These courses also led towards a degree in elementary educa-
tion, but the court refuted the contention of the Commissioner that the tax-
payer was meeting the minimum requirements of her trade or business. The
court held that the taxpayer was already employed in her trade or business
and was undertaking the additional education to maintain her employment,
not to obtain it.
In James E. Lane, 31 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1089 (1962), the taxpayer
took courses related to those which he taught even though they also led to
a master's degree. The court concluded that the primary purpose of the
expenditure was to improve the quality of the taxpayer's teaching with all
other motives being secondary and immaterial.
In Ruth Domigan Truxall, 31 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 795 (1962), the
taxpayer, a teacher holding a permanent certificate, took a trip to Mexico.
She received semester hours credit for the trip, which additional credit was
needed in order that she could meet the schedule for annual advancements
that the school board had set up (i.e., she would have lost salary rights
had she not fulfilled this obligation although her certificate and job were not
in jeopardy).
In Peggy A. King, 31 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 551 (1962), the taxpayer in-
curred expenses in quest of a Ph.D. degree. The taxpayer was a trained
social worker and was employed by the public school system in the field of
behavioral sciences. She obtained a leave of absence to pursue the Ph.D.
degree in education, and even though the taxpayer later abandoned the
1963]
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ever, inconsistency on the part of the courts in applying the regula-
tions has been significant.
In 1960 the Commissioner attempted to alleviate the problems
in this area by issuing Revenue Ruling 60-97."9 This ruling was an
effort to establish additional guidelines for the treatment of expenses
incurred for education. In regard to the allowance of the deduction
effort, the court felt that this work was undertaken primarily to maintain
and improve her skills in this field. The court also found from the evidence
that it was common and usual for people to obtain additional education in
this field.
In Elmer R. Johnson, 30 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 641 (1961), aff'd, 313 F.2d
668 (9th Cir. 1963), the taxpayer had to take additional courses in order
to obtain a new emergency teaching certificate. The fact that these courses
helped her to later get a permanent certificate was held to be incidental by
the court.
In Smith v. United States, 7 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 1238 (N.D. Fla.
1961), the taxpayer took a trip to Europe and claimed 90% of her total costs
as a business expense. The taxpayer was a college teacher, and the jury
found that the trip was taken primarily to maintain and improve the skill
required by the taxpayer in her job.
In Michaelson v. United States, 203 F. Supp. 830 (E.D. Wash. 1961),
aff'd, 313 F.2d 668 (9th Cir. 1963), the taxpayer incurred expenses in taking
courses which allowed him to renew a provisional teaching certificate
although these courses also led to a permanent teaching certificate and a
Bachelor of Law degree.
In Laurie S. Robertson, 37 T.C. 1153 (1962), acq., 1963 INT. Rnv.
BULL. No. 8, at 7, the taxpayer incurred expenses in an effort to obtain a
Ph.D. degree although this goal was never achieved. The taxpayer was
hired as a college instructor and was reappointed annually for five years
at which time he was given a leave of absence to complete his Ph.D. The
current policy of the college was that tenure could not be granted until
he attained a Ph.D. degree. The court found as a fact that this policy
was enacted subsequent to the hiring of the petitioner and for this reason
rejected the Commissioner's contention that the job was originally taken
on a conditional basis. The court concluded that this educational require-
ment was imposed by the university as a condition upon the taxpayer for the
retention of his salary, status, and employment.
In Reuben B. Hoover, 35 T.C. 566 (1961), acq., 1961-2 Cum. BuLL. 4,
a partial deduction was allowed for costs incurred by the petitioner in going
on a "medical seminar cruise" although the trip was taken primarily for
pleasure. The court felt that the taxpayer did receive some professional
benefit from part of the trip which included medical lectures and discussions.
In Evelyn L. Sanders, 29 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 364 (1960), a deduction
was allowed for expenses incurred by a teacher of art and geography in
taking a trip abroad. Approved traveling was one means of meeting a school
board requirement, and the board approved this trip. The court reasoned
that the petitioner's travel activities bore a logical relationship to the courses
which she taught and constituted a normal and natural response in light
of the school board's requirement.
See also Donald C. Hester, 1963 P-H TAX CT. REP. & MEM. DEc. (32
P-H Tax Ct. Mem.) 63,107; Lonnie R. Lenderman, 1963 P-H TAX CT.
REP. & MEm. DEc. (32 P-H Tax Ct. Mem.) 63,110.
"a 1960-1 Cum. BULL. 69.
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under the theory that the expense was incurred for the maintaining
and improving of skills, the ruling stated:
[I] t is necessary that the taxpayer show his purpose through
specific facts. In this connection it will be necessary for him
to establish that the education does maintain or improve skills
required in his employment or other business. The skills
"required" by the taxpayer in his employment or other trade
or business are those which are appropriate, helpful, or
needed.50
The most significant fault in this area today lies in the fact that
the courts are reluctant to place a proper interpretation on the last
preceding quoted sentence of the revenue ruling. This fault appears
to be the main reason for the inconsistency in the following illustra-
tions.
In Evelyn Devereauxi the taxpayer was a university instructor
under a contract of permanent tenure. There was no requirement
that he undertake any additional studies leading to a Ph.D. degree
in his field. The facts, however, indicate that studies leading to a
Ph.D. degree were undertaken before the taxpayer was given a con-
tract of permanent tenure in an effort to induce the university to re-
new his contract and secure his position. Since the Commissioner
could not argue that these expenses were incurred to meet the mini-
mum requirements of the taxpayer's chosen profession, he contended
that they were incurred primarily for the purpose of attaining sub-
stantial advancement in position and an increase in salary. The Tax
Court agreed with the Commissioner's contention and disallowed
the deduction.5"
The petitioner in Devereaux acting as his own counsel on this
claim which totaled less than 2000 dollars, appealed the result of the
Tax Court and emerged with a victory.53 The Third Circuit recog-
nized the fact that the regulations in this area are intended to be
liberally enforced. The court, however, based its reason for the
reversal on less than satisfactory grounds. The court indicated that
the taxpayer owed the university a "moral" obligation to continue
'
0 Id. at 70. (Emphasis added.)
5'29 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 509 (1960).
Quaere what the petitioner could have undertaken which would have
been any more appropriate and helpful in the teaching field.
" Devereaux v. Commissioner, 292 F.2d 637 (3d Cir. 1961).
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his studies leading to a Ph.D. degree in light of the fact that he used
this additional education as an inducement for renewal of his con-
tract. Therefore, the court concluded that the taxpayer was main-
taining his position by undertaking the studies, and that any promo-
tion or salary increase as a result of attaining the Ph.D. degree
would be incidental.54 While the result seems correct, the court,
nevertheless, failed to recognize that a taxpayer may incur educa-
tional expenses in an attempt to "run-in-place" although such educa-
tion leads to a doctorate degree and an advancement in salary.
In Joseph T. Booth, III" the petitioner, after attaining a law
degree and practicing for a short time, worked as an assistant legal
advisor to the Governor of Alabama. Later he and two other at-
torneys decided to open a practice together. He was designated to
attend New York University for the purpose of taking some tax
courses since it was agreed that none of the three partners-to-be
had enough knowledge in this field. The facts revealed that the tax-
payer had not taken any tax courses in law school; that he had
handled no tax cases during the brief period in which he had prac-
ticed; and that he had not handled any tax matters while working
as advisor to the Governor of Alabama. The taxpayer contended
that the courses were taken primarily to improve skills which he
required in practicing his profession. On the other hand, the Com-
missioner argued that the expenses were incurred in order that the
taxpayer could acquire a new skill or specialty and obtain a new
-position. In disallowing the expenditures, the Tax Court concluded
that the primary purpose of the education was to enable the taxpayer
ito become a partner in the newly formed law firm.
Perhaps on the facts presented in Booth, the petitioner did
:fail the "primary purpose" test. For this reason the result appears
satisfactory. However, a more difficult question would have been
presented if the obtaining of a new position had not been a pertinent
factor. The Commissioner, assumedly, still would have attacked the
allowance of the deduction on the ground that the taxpayer was
acquiring a new skill or specialty. In light of Nairow the court
might agree with this position. But it is questionable whether this
attack would be a valid one in light of the regulations and Revenue
Ruling 60-97. Admittedly, the taxpayer had attained the minimum
r The court rejected the Commissioner's contended applicability of ex-
ample (9) of Rev. Rul. 60-97, 1960-1 Cum. BULL. 69, 77-78.
'35 T.C. 1144 (1961).
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requirements necessary for the practice of his profession. But it is
believed that the taking of tax law courses by an attorney is appropri-
ate, helpful, and needed to improve and maintain his skills in the
legal field. It is suggested that the court should allow the deduction
in such a case if the regulations and Revenue Ruling 60-97 are inter-
preted in the proper light.
A case coming close to Booth on its facts and reaching a con-
trary result is Cosimo A. Carlucci.5" The taxpayer was employed
as an assistant research analyst in the field of industrial psychology
by an insurance company. He had attained several credit hours lead-
ing to a Ph.D. degree in industrial psychology, and in 1958 he took
nine additional credit hours towards this degree. It was not neces-
sary for the retention of his job that he obtain this degree, nor was
it a prerequisite leading to a promotion, although over the long run
his chances of a promotion or a salary increase would obviously be
enhanced. The petitioner contended that it was necessary for him
"to keep abreast of current knowledge, literature, and thinking in the
field, and that his purpose in taking such courses was to accomplish
that result and to maintain and improve his standing, in terms of
knowledge, as an industrial psychologist . . . . 7 The Tax Court
looked to the fact that he had already met the minimum requirements
of qualification in his chosen field, and to the fact that many other
persons employed in psychological research by the taxpayer's em-
ployer, either had Ph.D. degrees or were doing work towards a
graduate degree. This latter fact indicated to the court that such
additional education was customary in this field. Thus, the Tax
Court in Carlucci appeared to make an effort to carry out the in-
tended spirit of the regulations.
It was soon to be apparent that the thinking of the court in
Carlucci was predicated largely on the "custom" of the additional
education in the psychology field rather than on the more important
consideration that the education was appropriate, helpful, and needed.
This conclusion is substantiated by the result of the Tax Court in
Harold H. Davis.5" In this case the taxpayer was a college pro-
fessor on permanent tenure and was not required to undertake any
additional scholarly duties in his field. However, the college did
37 T.C. 695 (1962).
Id. at 700-01.
38 T.C. 175 (1962), appeal docketed, No. 18188, 9th Cir., July 23,
1962.
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encourage its professors to engage in research and writing activities.
Accordingly, the petitioner took a trip to Europe for the purpose of
studying source material, unavailable in the United States, for a book
in his field which he desired to write. The majority held that the
expenses were voluntary and were undertaken so that the taxpayer
could increase his prestige as a scholar. It was concluded that the
expenses were incurred to acquire additional reputation and learning,
and thus cannot be classified as ordinary and necessary business
deductions.
Six judges dissented from the result of Davis. They felt that
the expenses could be classified as ordinary and necessary so long
as they were appropriate to the profession of the taxpayer. Clearly
the thinking of the dissent is correct if the regulations and Revenue
Ruling 60-97 are to be given meaningful interpretation."" If the view
of the dissent is not adopted by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
in its review of this case,"0 it will amount to a significant step in the
wrong direction. Certainly the facts of Davis fall within the guide-
lines which have been issued to help the taxpayers and the courts in
this area, i.e., the expenses were appropriate and helpful for the
maintenance of the taxpayer's skills.
CONCLUSION
Much progress has been made in this area since the Hill case in
1950. To a large extent this has been made possible by the willing-
ness of the courts, except in Namrow and Davis, to apply the regula-
tions in a liberal manner. The Commissioner, however, still seems
unwilling to "fall in step" with the intended spirit of the regula-
tions. As a result of this, many taxpayers probably lose what should
be valid deductions due to the expense which would be involved in
attempting to litigate a small claim. The Commissioner's attitude
and attacks impair success of any attempt to forward education as the
" Dennehy v. Commissioner, 309 F.2d 149 (6th Cir. 1962), affirming
30 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 821 (1961), involved facts very similar to those
in Davis. The taxpayer, a full time college math instructor, took a trip to
Europe during his sabbatical summer. The facts revealed that his activities
on this trip were no different from those of most tourists taking a European
trip. Both the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals and the Tax Court denied
him a deduction for these expenses. It appears that there is a definite
factual distinction between Dennehty and Davis, and it is suggested that this
distinction is such that it was proper to deny Dennehy the deduction while
it was improper to treat Davis in the same manner.
" Appeal docketed, No. 18188, 9th Cir., July 23, 1962.
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means of professional improvement. Perhaps legislation in this
area will eventually be necessary if we are to attain such a goal.
In conclusion, the following statement of the district court judge
in Michaelson v. United States concerning the importance of this
deduction to the "little" taxpayer seems appropriate:
The importance of encouragement of individuals interested
in self-improvement should not be minimized. Certainly rapid
write-offs of investments in buildings, deductions for adver-
tising and deductions for expenses in those higher brackets,
are no more important to them than a smaller deduction is to
one who has limited funds, as the taxpayer here."1
H. ARTHUR SANDMAN
Conflict of Laws-Capacity to Sue-Which Law Should Govern?
It is generally accepted that the law of the place of wrong de-
termines whether a person has sustained a legal injury.1 In Shaw
v. Lee' this rule was applied to determine the capacity of one spouse
to sue the other. Plaintiff brought suit against her deceased hus-
band's estate alleging that while riding through Virginia in an
automobile owned and operated by her husband, she was injured
in a collision between the automobile and a truck, and that the colli-
sion was caused by the joint and concurrent negligence of her hus-
band and the truck driver. At the time of the injury plaintiff and
her husband were domiciled in North Carolina. The lower court
sustained defendant's demurrer to the complaint and on appeal the
supreme court affirmed. The court recognized that Virginia, unlike
North Carolina,' does not permit a married woman to sue her hus-
band for injuries negligently inflicted.
Shaw v. Lee was not a case of first impression. It reaffirmed
North Carolina's previous position4 and is in accord with the ma-
l1203 F. Supp. 830, 832-33 (E.D. Wash. 1961).
'Doss v. Sewell, 257 N.C. 404, 125 S.E.2d 899 (1962); Morse v. Walker,
229 N.C. 778, 51 S.E.2d 496 (1949); Wise v. Hollowell, 205 N.C. 286, 171
S.E. 82 (1933); 2 BEALE, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 378.2 (1935); RESTATEMENT,
CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 377-79 (1934); STUMBERG, CONFLICT OF LAWS 182(2d ed. 1951).
2258 N.C. 609, 129 S.E.2d 288 (1963).
"'A husband and wife have a cause of action against each other to recover
damages sustained to their person or property as if they were unmarried.'
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 52-10.1 (Supp. 1961).
'Howard v. Howard, 200 N.C. 574, 158 S.E. 101 (1931), is practically
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jority rule in this country--a rule which is a product of Beach's
vested rights theory.6 More recently, however, several cases have
established a trend-applauded by many writers in the field--away
from this mechanical application of a technical conflict of laws rule.
Instead they favor a conflicts rule which is shaped with regard to
the nature of the case at hand and gives more consideration to social,
economic, and domestic factors. This appears to be done best, in
order to stay within the existing framework for determining con-
flict rules, by a policy oriented method of characterization.' In
identical to the principal case, but there plaintiff sued her husband and not
his estate. Bogen v. Bogen, 219 N.C. 51, 12 S.E.2d 649 (1941), involved
the reverse situation. There the husband and wife were domiciled in Ohio,
where the common-law rule of family immunity was in force, and the acci-
dent occurred in North Carolina. The court refused to apply the law of the
family domicile and held the wife was entitled to maintain her action.
See Annot., 22 A.L.R.2d 1248 (1952).
' Beach, Uniform Interstate Enforcement of Vested Rights, 27 YALE
L. J. 656 (1918). See 2 BEALE, CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 377.2-78.2 (1935).
The theoretic premise of vested rights is that when a case is decided
with multi-state contacts, a right is enforced which vested under the law
of the appropriate state. In the case of torts this is the place of the injury.
The purpose is to promote uniformity, and in turn discourage forum shop-
ping. "Its greatest virtue is its simplicity, the facility of its application. It
reduces the legal mental process to a minimum because, once having deter-
mined that the matter is one of the substance, all that is left to do is to look
to the place where the harmful force first took injurious effect and then to
apply without distinction the substantive law there. Its universal adoption,
besides bringing about uniformity, would enable the lawyer in advising his
client to predict with facility and accuracy the judicial results in any situa-
tion, regardless of where suit might be brought." STUMBERG, CONFLICT OF
LAWS 201 (2d ed. 1951).
" Bingham, The Rise and Fall of Buckeye v. Buckeye, 1931-1959: Marital
Immunity for Torts in Conflict of Laws, 29 U. CHI. L. REv. 237 (1962);
Currie, Survival of Actions: Adjudication Versus Automation in the Conflict
of Laws, 10 STAN. L. Rav. 205 (1958); Ford, Interspousal Liability for
Automobile Accidents in the Conflict of Laws: Law and Reason Versus the
Restatement, 15 U. PITT. L. REv. 397 (1954); Kelso, Automobile Accidents
and Indiana Conflict of Laws: Current Dilemmas, 33 IND. L. J. 297 (1958);
Packel, Backward and Forward in Conflicts, 31 TEMP. L. Q. 117 (1958).
See also STUMBERG, CONFLICT OF LAWS 201-12 (2d ed. 1951), for a criticism
of the place of the tort rule.
s Some cases also refuse to follow the place of the tort rule because the
foreign law, if applied, would be contrary to the public policy of the forum.
Gooch v. Faucett, 122 N.C. 270, 29 S.E. 362 (1898). See generally RESTATE-
mExT, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 5, comment b (1934).
In several cases the state of the forum and domicile has upheld the family
immunity rule when the accident occurred in a state where the immunity
had been abolished, on the ground that public policy of the forum forbade
one spouse from suing the other. Kircher v. Kircher, 288 Mich. 669, 286
N.W. 120 (1939); Kyle v. Kyle, 210 Minn. 204, 297 N.W. 744 (1941);
Mertz v. Mertz, 271 N.Y. 466, 3 N.E.2d 597 (1936); Poling v. Poling, 116
W. Va. 187, 179 S.E. 604 (1935). These decisions may be responsible for
sbme obvious, forum shopping by spouses who in similar situations bring
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most instances the characterization determines the choice of law
rule which applies, so where the court characterizes an issue in a
tort action as "procedural" rather than "substantive" the law of the
forum applies and not the law of the place of wrong.' If an issue
is characterized as "contract" the law of the place of contracting may
determine questions concerning the formation of the contract, while
the law of the place of performance may determine questions re-
lating to its performance;1" and if characterized as "family law" the
law of the domicile may be said to be the proper law to govern.'
Such a policy oriented method of characterization has been
applied by a few courts to problems involving family immunity,
capacity to sue, and other related issues. 2 The leading case among
their actions in the state where the accident occurred. To apply the place
of the tort rule under these circumstances, as North Carolina did in Bogen
v. Bogen, 219 N.C. 51, 12 S.E.2d 649 (1941), does not promote uniformity,
but rather encourages forum shopping.
ESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 585 (1934).
In Charnock v. Taylor, 223 N.C. 360, 26 S.E.2d 911 (1943), plaintiff sued
A for injuries arising out of an accident in Tennessee. A then sought tojoin B for contribution as a joint tortfeasor under what is now N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 1-240 (1953). The common law was still in force in Tennessee
where there was no right of action by one joint tortfeasor to enforce contri-
bution from another. The court characterized the right to join for contri-
bution as substantive, and dismissed the action against B under Tennessee
law.
"o RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 311, 358 (1934). But see Ru-
STATEMENT (SECOND), CONFLICT OF LAWS § 332 (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1960),
which now says the validity of a contract is determined by the law of the
state with which the contract has its most significant relationship-which
might be the state chosen by the parties, the state of the contracting, or the
state where performance is to take place.
In Levy v. Daniels' U-Drive Auto Renting Co., 108 Conn. 333, 143 At.
163 (1928), a Connecticut statute provided that anyone renting a motor
vehicle to another should be liable for any damage caused to any person by
the operation of such vehicle while rented. The defendant rented A an auto-
mobile, and plaintiff was injured by A's negligent operation of the automo-
bile in Massachusetts. The court characterized this as a contract action
rather than tort and applied the law of Connecticut, which was the place of
contracting.
" See 1 BEAL, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 110.1 (1935); RESTATEMENT, CON-
FLIT OF LAWS § 54 (1934).
2 Emery v. Emery, 45 Cal. 2d 421, 289 P.2d 218 (1955), applied the law
of the family domicile and not the place of the tort. The court characterized
the issue as one of capacity to sue and permitted the wife and her two un-
emancipated daughters to sue the husband and father for personal injuries
sustained in an automobile accident. Bruton v. Villoria, 138 Cal. App. 2d
642, 292 P.2d 638 (1956), refused to apply California law and impute the
husband's negligence to the wife. The wife sued defendant for injuries she
sustained in an automobile collision between defendant and her husband in
California. The court applied the law of plaintiff's domicile, where the
husband's negligence would not bar her recovery. Koplik v. C. P. Trucking
Corp., 27 N.J. 1, 141 A.2d 34 (1958), decided a wife could not sue her hus-
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these is Haumschild v. Continental Cas. Co.,13 involving facts sub-
stantially similar to the principal case except that the issue of
capacity to sue was characterized as "family law." The plaintiff
sued her husband in Wisconsin, where they were domiciled, for
personal injuries sustained as a result of an automobile accident in
California, but unlike the principal case the Wisconsin Supreme
Court overruled its previous position 4 saying:
We are convinced that, from both the standpoint of public
policy and logic, the proper solution of the conflict-of-laws
problem, in cases similar to the instant action, is to hold that
the law of the domicile is the one that ought to be applied in
determining any issue of incapacity to sue based upon family
relationship. 5
The social function of both the law of torts and domestic rela-
tions would be best served if the court in the principal case, like
Haumschild, had characterized the issue as an incident of "family
law" to be governed by the law of the domicile.' 6 Why indeed are
problems of the law of torts ordinarily decided in accordance with
the law of the place of the wrong? If it is to carry out the social
purpose of the law, then what is the social purpose and function of
the law of torts?
The law of torts is the body of rules which indicates under what
circumstances one person who has suffered a loss can shift such loss
to another member of society.'1 While ordinarily a loss lies where
it falls, under special circumstances one can shift his loss to another,
as in the case where the other person "caused" the loss through con-
duct falling short of the standard set by the community. The com-
band in New Jersey where they were domiciled, even though the accident
occurred in New York where such suits are permitted.
See also Grant v. McAuliffe, 41 Cal. 2d 859, 264 P.2d 944 (1953), where
the issue was the survival of a cause of action for personal injury after
defendant's death. In Arizona, where the injury occurred, it did not sur-
vive, but in California, the defendant's domicile, it did. The court charac-
terized this as a problem of administration of estates and applied the sur-
vival law of the forum.
" 7 Wis. 2d 130, 95 N.W.2d 814 (1959).
" Buckeye v. Buckeye, 203 Wis. 248, 234 N.W. 342 (1931), was a leading
authority for the rule as applied by the principal case.
7 Wis. 2d at 137, 95 N.W.2d at 818 (1959).
' Ford, supra note 7, at 417, points out that in the civil law countries in-
terspousal actions sounding in tort are treated primarily as incidents of the
family law and governed by the law of the family domicile.




munity which sets the standard should be the community where
the harm will be manifested. Such considerations are the founda-
tion of the rule that problems of tort law should be governed by the
law of the place of the wrong. These same considerations should
also determine the scope of the rule's application.
Therefore, in determining whether the rule should apply to such
a problem as that of allowing a law suit between members of a
family, it should be asked whether this is primarily a problem of
shifting loss or one of regulating the relations between the members
of a family. Since the two reasons most often advanced for the
common law rule of family immunity are the ancient concept the
husband and wife constitute in law but one person, and that to
permit such suits will create family discord and disrupt family
harmony,"8 it would appear that for problems of this kind the most
appropriate law is that of the family domicile. 9
In light of these considerations this writer suggests that North
Carolina amend G.S. § 5Z-10.1 to provide that a husband and wife
domiciled in North Carolina have a cause of action against each other
to recover for injuries, wherever sustained, as if they were unmarried.
SAMUEL S. WOODLEY, JR.
Constitutional Law-Case or Controversy-Dismissal for Mootness
Where a decision in a case at bar will have no effect because of
some intervening fact which has rendered the case moot, the United
" Ford, supra note 7, at 398, sets out the historical background and rea-
sons for disallowing suits between spouses.
Johnson v. People's First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 394 Pa. 116, 145 A.2d
716 (1958), held that the doctrine of intrafamily immunity from suit by a
member of the family expires upon the death of the person protected and does
not extend to a decedent's estate for the reason that death terminates the
family relationship and there is no longer a relationship in which the state
or public policy has an interest.
10 The court in the principal case also dismissed plaintiff's plea for re-
covery under North Carolina's Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Act
of 1957 by pointing out that liability insurance protects against claims
legally asserted, but does not itself produce liability. Plaintiff, however, did
not contend that the presence of liability insurance should create liability,
but rather contended with some merit that by allowing defendant immunity,
the public policy of the state, as expressed by the vehicle responsibility act,
for protecting its citizens who are injured in automobile accidents would be
contravened. In North Carolina a wife who is injured by her husband's
negligent operation of an automobile will have the protection of the insurance
required under this act, but by denying plaintiff the same protection, because
she happened to incur her injury across the state line, the insurance company
is given a fortuitous windfall.
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States Supreme Court will order the case dismissed.' That the
Court will summarily dismiss a mooted case has long been one of
the basic principles in its disposition of cases. But the question of
whether or not a case is moot is not so easily disposed of. Where
a decision by the Court would affect the parties, the Court will
decide the case on its merits.2 Even where one issue of the case has
become moot, the Court will decide the case if there are other issues
involved which remain alive.3
The events which can occur to render a case moot are legion.
A case will be dismissed as moot if the relief sought has already
been granted,4 as where the parties have settled pending appeal," or
defendant has paid plaintiff the amount contested ;6 if a statute has
been passed which renders the action unnecessary; 7 if one seeking
admission to a school has passed school age;' if, in an election dis-
pute, those elected have already been seated by Congress;" or if the
act sought to be enjoined has already been completed by the time
the Court hears the case.' 0 The latter result is unaffected by the
1Brownlow v. Schwartz, 261 U.S. 216 (1923); Security Mut. Life Ins.
Co. v. Prewitt, 200 U.S. 446 (1906); Mills v. Green, 159 U.S. 651 (1895);
United States v. Phillips, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 776 (1832).
2 In Eagles v. United States ex rel. Samuels, 329 U.S. 304 (1946), peti-
tioner had contested being drafted. The circuit court ordered him released
from service. On appeal to the Supreme Court he contended the case was
moot. The Court held that it was not moot because a reversal would necessi-
tate his re-induction into the Army.3 In Wilson v. United States, 232 U.S. 563 (1914), petitioner reached the
Supreme Court only by asserting that the White Slave Act was unconstitu-
tional. By the time the Court heard this case, the constitutional issue had
been settled by another case. Held, that having taken jurisdiction on the
constitutional point, the Court would retain jurisdiction to decide the rest
of the case, though the constitutional question was moot. Accord, Michigan
Cent. R.R. v. Vreeland, 227 U.S. 59 (1913).
' Taylor v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 709 (1959) (petitioner had been re-instated
in his job); Gray v. Board of Trustees, 342 U.S. 517 (1952) (Negro peti-
tioners had been admitted to previously segregated school).
'Buck's Stove & Range Co. v. AFL, 219 U.S. 581 (1911); Gardner v.
Goodyear Dental Vulcanite Co., 131 U.S. ciii App. (1873).
' California v. San Pablo & T.R.R., 149 U.S. 308 (1893); Singer Mfg.
Co. v. Wright, 141 U.S. 696 (1891); San Mateo County v. Southern Pac.
R.R., 116 U.S. 138 (1885).
"United States v. Alaska S.S. Co., 253 U.S. 113 (1920).
8 Doremus v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 429 (1952); Atherton Mills v.
Johnston, 259 U.S. 13 (1922).
9 Richardson v. McChesney, 218 U.S. 487 (1910); Jones v. Montague, 194
U.S. 147 (1904).
10 Gray v. Board of Trustees, 342 U.S. 517 (1952); Security Mut. Life
Ins. Co. v. Prewitt, 200 U.S. 446 (1906) (disputed permit to do business had
expired); Mills v. Green, 159 U.S. 651 (1895) (disputed delegates to con-
stitutional convention had been seated).
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fact that a damage remedy is still available.' The Court twice dis-
missed cases where alleged anti-trust violations had been halted
because of World War I.12
In an unusual context, the Supreme Court has substantially
changed the law on mootness. In Robinson v. California3 the Court
reversed defendant's conviction and held that a California statute
making the status of dope addiction a crime was unconstitutional.
Afterward, the state of California filed an alternate petition for
rehearing and for an abatement of the judgment on the ground that
defendant had died before the Court decided the case. In a memo-
randum decision the Court denied the petition for rehearing.1 4 Jus-
tice Clark, with whom Justices Harlan and Stewart joined, wrote a
dissenting opinion. Justice Clark called the decision of the Court
a "meaningless gesture utterly useless in the disposition of the case-
the appellant being dead-and, as I read our cases, is contrary to
the general policy this Court has always followed . . . "
For over a century, the Court has consistently held that the
death of an appealing defendant renders the case moot. In fact, the
usual statement has been that upon the happening of defendant's
death, the case is treated as having abated altogether."0 Every cir-
cuit court ruling on the matter has held that the action is void ab
initio, and that a fine levied on the defendant in the trial court can-
not now be recovered from his personal representative.' 7  From this
'x Local 8-6, AFL-CIO v. Missouri, 361 U.S. 363 (1960).
" United States v. American-Asiatic S.S. Co., 242 U.S. 537 (1917);
United States v. Hamburg-Amerikanische Packetfahrtactien Gesellschaft, 239
U.S. 466 (1916). These cases involved alleged anti-trust violations between
American, British, and German steamship companies. The companies had
of necessity ceased doing business together because of World War I, and
the Court held that this rendered the case moot. Uriited States v. W.T. Grant
Co., 345 U.S. 629 (1953) is distinguishable. There the Court held that the
case was not moot simply because defendant had filed an affidavit stating that
he would resign his positions which had brought about Clayton Act interlock-
ing directorate prosecution. The Court stated that defendant would still be
free to resume his former practices if a decision were not reached.12370 U.S. 660 (1962). See Note, 41 N.C.L. Rav. 244 (1963).
a' Robinson v. California, 371 U.S. 905 (1962).
5 Id. at 905.
"Singer v. United States, 323 U.S. 338 (1945); Menken v. Atlanta,
131 U.S. 405 (1889); United States v. Daniel, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 11 (1848).
'17 Daniel v. United States, 268 F.2d 849 (5th Cir. 1959); Howard v.
Wilbur, 166 F.2d 884 (6th Cir. 1948); United States v. Mook, 125 F.2d 706(2d Cir. 1942) ; Baldwin v. United States, 72 F.2d 810 (9th Cir. 1934) ; Rossi
v. United States, 21 F.2d 747 (8th Cir. 1927) ; Pino v. United States, 278 Fed.
479 (7th Cir. 1921) ; United States v. Theurer, 213 Fed. 964 (5th Cir. 1914) ;
Dyar v. United States, 186 Fed. 614 (5th Cir. 1911) ; United States v. Dunne,
173 Fed. 254 (9th Cir. 1909).
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it necessarily appears that Robinson must stand for a drastic change
in the Court's policy on mootness cases, despite the relatively narrow
context of the denial of a petition for rehearing.
The dissenters in Robinson, in citing Stewart v. Southern Ry., 18
outlined the procedure usually followed by the Court in such cases.
There, the Court had already decided the case on appeal, not know-
ing that the parties had previously settled. On petition for rehearing
this fact was pointed out to the Court, and as a result the Court
granted the petition, vacated the former judgment and remanded
to the district court with directions to dismiss the suit as moot. 0
A line of decisions separate from the Robinson case may indicate
a trend toward finding cases not moot. In these cases the defendant
had been released from prison pending the appeal; hence, they are
distinguishable from the principal case in which defendant had died
pending the appeal. In the first two cases in this series the Court
merely dismissed the appeal as moot. 20  Then, in Lewis v. United
States,2' there was a suggestion that if the defendant could have
been tried again for the offense (it was nol prossed below), the case
might not have been moot. Next came the landmark case of St.
Pierre v. United States.22 This case differed little from the earlier
cases in its actual holding-a dismissal of the case as moot-but
was important for the incidental hint it contained which was adopted
by the Court in later decisions. The Court stated: "Nor has peti-
tioner shown that under either state or federal law further penalties
or disabilities can be imposed on him as a result of the judgment
which has now been satisfied. 23  Finally, in Fiswick v. United
States,2 4 the budding theory blossomed as the Court unanimously
held the case not moot although the defendant had already been
released from prison. The Court pointed out that the defendant was
an alien and was liable to be deported for conviction of this crime,
that a conviction might harm any naturalization plans the defendant
had, and that he might also suffer the loss of certain civil rights. On
18315 U.S. 784 (1942).
See Little v. Bowers, 134 U.S. 547 (1890). In Cahill v. New York,
N.H. & H.R.R., 351 U.S. 183 (1956), the Court had already decided the
case and had denied a petition for rehearing, but on defendant's motion to
recall, the case was re-opened in the interest of fairness.
2 Ex parte Baez, 177 U.S. 378 (1900) ; United States v. Phillips, 31 U.S.
(6 Pet.) 776 (1832).
- 216 U.S. 611 (1910).
22 319 U.S. 41 (1943).
23 Id. at 43.2,4329 U.S. 211 (1946).
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these grounds the case was distinguished from St. Pierre. Thus the
doctrine of "collateral consequences," first mentioned in St. Pierre,
was actually applied in Fiswick.
In United States v. Morgani5 the doctrine's growth continued,
the Court holding in a five to four decision that the case was not moot
although defendant had been released from prison, since he had
already been convicted of another crime in a state court and was
subject to a longer sentence as a second offender. In Pollard v.
United States26 the doctrine reached its fullest development. The
Court, although divided five to four on the merits, was unanimous
in holding that the case was not moot. The Court said: "We think
that petitioner's reference to the above cases (Morgan and Fiswick)
sufficiently satisfies the requirement that review in this Court will
be allowed only when its judgment will have some material effect.
The possibility of consequences collateral to the imposition of sen-
tence is sufficiently substantial to justify our dealing with the
merits."2 7 It is significant to note that there were no unusual con-
sequences in this case, such as possible deportation or second offender
conviction, as were present in prior cases. Here the Court was
talking only about the normal consequences of conviction of a
felony-moral stigma, loss of certain civil rights, etc.
The onrush of the doctrine of collateral consequences came to
an abrupt halt in Parker v. Ellis.2 s The majority in a per curiam
decision held that since the petitioner had been released pending a
hearing in the Court on his habeas corpus writ, and since the writ
could not issue if there were no detention, the case was moot. The
majority said that Pollard was poorly considered and probably
overruled by Heflin v. United States.29 The Chief Justice, joined
by Justices Douglas, Black and Brennan, dissented. The dissenters
argued that Pollard should control this case and that the Court had
never overruled Pollard either directly or by implication. Both the
Chief Justice and Justice Douglas, in a separate dissenting opinion,
pointed out the collateral consequences involved and said that the
harm done defendant below should be undone.30
2- 346 U.S. 502 (1954).
'e 352 U.S. 354 (1957).2
7 Id. at 358.
362 U.S. 574 (1960).
.- 358 U.S. 415 (1959). The Court did not cite Pollard.
20 Chief Justice Warren stated: "Conviction of a felony imposes a status
upon a person which not only makes him vulnerable to future sanctions
through new civil disability statutes, but which also seriously affects his
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Just how much effect the Parker case will have on the collateral
consequences doctrine is highly debatable, for it is at least inferable
that Robinson represents a swing back in the other direction.
Whether Robinson represents such a swing or not, there can be
little doubt that the companion case of Wetzel v. Ohio8l does so
indicate. In that case the defendant died pending the appeal and
his wife as administratrix filed a motion to be substituted as a party.
The state filed a motion to dismiss the appeal. In a per curiam deci-
sion, the Court granted the wife's motion. It also granted the state's
motion to dismiss the appeal for want of a substantial federal ques-
tion. The case is significant in that the Court, by allowing the wife's
motion, necessarily decided that the case was not moot, and reached
a determination on the merits.
Justice Douglas' concurring opinion in Wetzel, which sheds the
only light upon the reasoning of the majority, was based mainly upon
the collateral consequences involved in the case. In Ohio the costs
in a criminal case are charged personally to the defendant and his
property may be sold in enforcement of this."2 The Ohio Court of
Appeals has held that the death of a defendant did not abate the
cause, but merely left the judgment as it stood before the appeal."8
However, in the same case that court said that it did not decide the
question of whether defendant's estate was liable for the payment of
costs. But Justice Douglas said that Ohio law is apparently to the
effect that costs can be collected from a deceased's estate. Justice
Douglas cited and relied on Pollard, the key case in the "collateral
consequences" line of decisions. He specifically refused to pass
upon whether decedent's family's interest in his good name satisfied
the case or controversy requirement, but his mentioning it at all may
indicate a possible future trend.34
Justice Clark, joined by Justices Harlan and Stewart, dissented
on the ground that the Court had on numerous times held that the
existence of a judgment taxing costs in such cases cannot alone
reputation and economic opportunities .... [T]here is an important public
interest involved in declaring the invalidity of a conviction obtained in vio-
lation of the Constitution. . . ." Parker v. Ellis, 362 U.S. 574, 593-4 (1960).
8'371 U.S. 62 (1962).
3 Onio REV. CODE §§ 2949.14, .15 (1954).
8 State v. Sholiton, 128 N.E.2d 666 (Ct. App. Ohio 1954).
"' In United States v. Mook, 125 F.2d 706 (2d Cir. 1942), the court stated
in a per curiam decision: "Nevertheless, we think it may not be amiss to
say that it seems to us that the next-of-kin of a convicted person who dies
pending an appeal have an interest in clearing his good name, which Con-
gress might well believe would justify a change in the law."
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prevent dismissal. There is indeed a long line of cases supporting
the proposition that no appeal lies from a mere decree respecting
costs.
3 5
It seems clear that the Robinson and Wetzel cases establish some
new rules in the field of mootness. Whether or not they will be
followed is of course not known. But it appears that the Court has
applied the collateral consequences line of cases, previously limited
to situations where the defendant had been released from prison,
to cases where the defendant has died. It also appears that the doc-
trine, which was under attack in Parker, has been revived, and that
Pollard still stands. It is not here intended to argue whether the
Court is right or wrong in these decisions, but it is hoped that the
Court in future cases will make clear to the public and to the bar
what its position is on this matter, preferably with a full decision
squarely discussing the problem.
LAWRENCE T. HAMMOND, JR.
Constitutional Law-Financial Responsibility Act-Liability of In-
surer Without Notice
In Lane v. Iowa Mut. Ins. Co.' the North Carolina Supreme
Court recently affirmed a trial court decision imposing liability on
a defendant who had absolutely no notice or opportunity to be heard
before his liability became irrevocably fixed.
The plaintiff was injured in an automobile accident as a result
of the negligence of an "assigned risk" whom the defendant insured.'
The insured did not stop at the scene of the accident and did not
file an accident report3 Consequently, neither the plaintiff nor the
"Heitmuller v. Stokes, 256 U.S. 359 (1921); Wingert v. First Natl
Bank, 223 U.S. 670 (1912); Paper-Bag Cases, 105 U.S. 766 (1882); Elastic
Fabrics Co. v. Smith, 100 U.S. 110 (1879); Canter v. American Ins. Co., 28
U.S. (3 Pet.) 307 (1830). But where the authority of the court below to
assess the costs which it levied is challenged, the case is not moot even
though the costs are all that remain to be settled. Newton v. Consolidated
Gas Co., 265 U.S. 78 (1924) ; Citizens' Bank v. Cannon, 164 U.S. 319 (1896).
-258 N.C. 318, 128 S.E.2d 398 (1962).
2 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-279.34 (Supp. 1961), provides that the Commis-
sioner of Insurance shall equitably apportion among insurance carriers "those
applicants for motor vehicle policies who are required to file proof of financial
responsibility.. . but who are unable to secure such insurance through ordi-
nary methods."
'N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 20-166, to -182 (Supp. 1961) provide that a wilful
failure to stop is punishable by imprisonment for up to five years and/or a
fine of $500. Failure to file an accident report as required by N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 20-166.1 (Supp. 1961) is a misdemeanor.
1963]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
investigating officer included the insured's name on the accident
reports they were required to file.' Such inclusion would have given
the defendant notice of the accident.' When the plaintiff subse-
quently discovered the identity of the insured, service of process was
obtained, and judgment by default and inquiry followed against the
insured. The insured failed to inform the defendant of the accident
or the suit, thereby breaching his insurance contract.' When the
plaintiff sued to collect as judgment creditor,7 the trial court found
that the defendant was liable, despite the complete lack of notice.
On appeal, the defendant claimed that the statute, as applied, was
unconstitutional as violating the due process requirements of notice
and opportunity to be heard. The court held that the constitutional
question could not be entertained because it had not been raised at
the trial.' The defendant's liability became absolute on the happen-
ing of the accident, and subsequent policy violations by the insured
could not operate to defeat the plaintiff's right to recover.9
Where the contract of insurance was voluntarily made by the
parties in the normal course of business, the court, in a situation
similar to the principal case, had the constitutional issue squarely
before it and decided against the insurer.' 0 The court reasoned that
IN.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-166.1 (Supp. 1961), states that where property
damage is $100 or more, the persons involved in the accident and the in-
vestigating officer must file a report to the Department of Motor Vehicles
within tventy-four hours.5 When the accident reports are received by the Department of Motor
Vehicles, a matching process takes place. If one driver fails to file a report,
the department obtains his name from the other driver's report and imme-
diately requests the filing of the report. When the report is finally filed, a
portion of it is detached and sent to the insurance carrier involved, as notice
to the insurance company that its insured has been involved in an accident.
Since the identity of the insured was not discovered within the twenty-
four hour limit, the name of the insured was not available for the filing of
the reports. This meant the department had no way of making the insured
file the report so that the insurer would get notice of the accident. See Brief
for Defendent, p. 6.
'The insurance contract provided that the insured was to give notice to
the insurer as soon as practicable; the insured was to forward all notices
and legal papers sent to him; and the insurer was to be allowed to investi-
gate all or any claims deemed expedient by it. See Brief for Defendant, p. 4.
7 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-279.21(f) (1), (2) (Supp. 1961), provides that
the liability of the insurance company becomes absolute on the occurrence of
the accident. No policy violations by the insured can relieve the insurer of
its liability. The injured party has the right to recover from the insurer
without first satisfying the judgment against the insured.
8258 N.C. 318, 322, 128 S.E.2d 398, 400 (1962).
" N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-279.21(f) (1) (Supp. 1961).




the insurer assumed the risk of liability without notice from the
insured when it voluntarily entered into the agreement. Therefore,
the insurer was deemed to have waived his constitutional right to
notice. This holding is in accord with cases in other jurisdictions
which operate under similar financial responsibility statutes." How-
ever, the theory of these cases is inapposite where the contract is not
entirely voluntary, as with an "assigned risk." Moreover, in each
of these cases the insurer had at least some knowledge that its in-
sured had been involved in an accident.'"
In the principal case, although refusing to consider the consti-
tutional issue, the court referred to the middle district's decision in
Sanders v. Travelers Indem. Co. 3 on this point. However, the
only reference in that case to constitutionality is that "assigned
risk" legislation has been upheld. 4 Adequate notice and hearing
from a constitutional standpoint were not discussed. No direct
holding on the constitutionality of the statute as applied to the facts
in the principal case has been found.
To fully appreciate the nature of the problem raised, but not
decided, in the principal case, some basic factors must first be con-
sidered. In the absence of the type of financial responsibility statute
which North Carolina now has, the injured party derives his right
to collect from the insurer through the insured.'5 The injured party's
rights against the insurer are founded on the insurance contract.
Therefore if the insured breaches his contract by failing to abide by
the notice requirement, the injured party's rights against the insurer
are defeated. Under the financial responsibility act, the injured
party no longer has merely a derivative right. His rights are now
based on the statute, rather than the insurance contract.' 6 Therefore,
any violations of the contract, such as failure to give notice, do not
"
1E.g., Royal Indem. Co. v. Olmstead, 193 F.2d 451 (9th Cir. 1951);
Wilkinson v. Maryland Cas. Co., 119 F. Supp. 383 (E.D. Va. 1953); Kruger
v. California Highway Indem. Exch., 201 Cal. 672, 258 Pac. 602 (1927);
National Indem. Co. v. Simmons, 230 Md. 234, 186 A.2d 595 (1962).
" There appears to be no definite rule as to what can serve as constructive
notice. See Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306,
314 (1950). Even if constructive notice could be founded on the insurer's
knowledge of the accident, there would be no constructive notice in the prin-
cipal case because the insurer had no knowledge whatever of the accident.
144 F. Supp. 742 (M.D.N.C. 1956).
1
,Id. at 744.
See, e.g., Baldwin v. Fidelity Phenix Fire Ins. Co., 260 F.2d 951 (6th
Cir. 1958) ; Sheldon v. Bennett, 282 Mass. 240, 184 N.E. 722 (1933) ; Muncie
v. Travelers Ins. Co., 253 N.C. 74, 116 S.E.2d 482 (1960).
", See note 11 supra; 48 COLUm. L. REv. 799, 800 (1948).
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defeat the statutory right. Public policy demands that an injured
party's right to recover should not be defeated by an irresponsible
motorist's failure to give notice to his insurer.17 This line of rea-
soning, while sound, does not encompass a basic tenet of our legal
system that:
An elementary and fundamental requirement of due process in
any proceeding, which is to be accorded finality is notice rea-
sonably calculated, under all circumstances, to apprise in-
terested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them
an opportunity to present their objections .... The notice
must be of such nature as reasonably to convey the required
information... and it must afford a reasonable time for those
interested to make their appearance.1
s
The conclusion follows that notice must be viewed in two aspects:
(1) as a requirement of the contract between the insurer and the
insured (which does not affect the insurer's liability), and (2) as
a requirement of due process (which does affect the insurer's
liability).
It is apparent that when a situation comparable to the principal
case reappears with a constitutional objection at the trial level, the
statute may be declared unconstitutional. Although the statutory
Tequirement that the insurer's liability will not be defeated by the
insured's failure to give notice appears to be unobjectionable, the
requirement of some sort of notice persists. The notice requirement
of due process is so embedded in our system of jurisprudence that a
statute imposing liability with absolutely no notice must necessarily
be invalid. 9
The court might, however, uphold the statute by applying the
"assumption of risk" theory. The insurer voluntarily chose to do
11 For a discussion of the deprivation of certain defenses of insurers, in-
cluding the insured's failure to give notice, see 40 ORE. L. REv. 351 (1961).8 Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314
(1950). In this case the Court held that notice by publication of settlements
of a trustee's account was insufficient to meet the requirements of due process
where the trustee knew of the beneficiaries' whereabouts. The principle of
Mulane has been repeatedly reaffirmed. Schroeder v. City of New York,
371 U.S. 208 (1962) (notice of condemnation proceedings published in county
newspapers); Walker v. City of Hutchinson, 352 U.S. 112 (1956) (notice by
publication of proceeding to fix compensation under eminent domain) ; Covey
v. Town of Somers, 351 U.S. 141 (1956) (notice of foreclosure of tax lien
by mail where person was known incompetent without guardian).
19 See note 18 supra and accompanying text.
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business in the state, knowing that he would have to deal with
"assigned risks" and that he would be subject to liability without
notice. Therefore the insurer waived his constitutional right to
notice. No cases have been found upholding any such condition
precedent to doing business in a state. Moreover, such a require-
ment would probably be "arbitrary and capricious" and hence un-
constitutional, since a reasonable alternative exists whereby notice
could be afforded the insurer.20
It is clear that curative legislation is needed in order to afford the
insurer notice and thereby prevent the statute from being invalidated.
Several devices could be used to effect this purpose: (1) make the
insurer a necessary party to the suit, (2) require the injured party
to give notice to the insurer, or21 (3) require that notice be given to
the insurer before damages are assessed on a default judgment.22
None of these would impose a great burden on the injured party,
because once the insured is found, it is a simple matter to locate the
insurer.2 3
By affording the insurer notice, the following results might be
obtained: (1) the opportunity for settlement out of court, and (2) a
reduction of the possibility of collusion between an unscrupulous
insured and a third party. Such curative legislation would not only
afford the insurer the requisite due process, but would also benefit
both the public and the courts.
JOHN SIKES JOHNSTON
20 There have been no cases decided on whether deprivation of notice could
be imposed on corporations by the state as a condition precedent to doing
business in the state. However, there have been numerous cases invalidating
regulations on businesses where the desired result could have been accom-
plished by alternative means which entailed a much lesser deprivation. See,
e.g., Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951); Weaver v.
Palmer Bros. Co., 270 U.S. 402 (1926).
" The insurer argued that either it should have been made a party to the
suit, or the plaintiff should have been required to notify it of the suit. Brief
for Defendant, p. 13. The plaintiff answered that this was a problem for the
legislature. Brief for Plaintiff, p. 7.
"' ME. Rlv. STAT. ch. 22, § 80(II) (E) (Supp. 1961) contains this pro-
vision.
"' This seems apparent because of the ease with which the injured party
discovered the insurance company for the purpose of satisfying the defaultjudgment in the principal case.
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Criminal Law-Evidence--Admissibility of Post Arraignment Con-
fessions
In Killough v. United States' the defendant was arrested for the
murder of his wife and held for thirty-four hours before arraignment,
during which time he signed a written confession. He was then
taken before a magistrate and advised of his right to have counsel
and to remain silent.2 The preliminary hearing was then adjourned
for twenty days to allow him to obtain counsel and to enable counsel
time to prepare a defense. He was then committed to jail. Twenty
hours after arraignment, and before he had obtained counsel, de-
fendant voluntarily agreed to a visit by one of the police officers to
whom he had confessed the previous day. The purpose of the
officer's visit was not to obtain an affirmation of the previous con-
fession, but to return articles of clothing and to secure a burial release
of the wife's body. During the conversation defendant orally con-
fessed to the crime. The trial court excluded the written confession
under the McNabb'-Upshaw4 -Mallory5 line of cases. However, the
court found the oral confession made after arraignment to have been
voluntary and properly admissible. Defendant was found guilty of
manslaughter and appealed. The court of appeals reversed, holding
the second confession inadmissible as a "fruit of the first."'
Rule 5 (a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure7 provides
'No. 16398, D.C. Cir., Oct. 4, 1962.2 "(a) Appearance before the Commissioner. An officer making an arrest
under a warrant issued upon a complaint or any person making an arrest
without a warrant shall take the arrested person without unnecessary delay
before the nearest available commissioner or before any other nearby officer
empowered to commit persons charged with offenses against the laws of the
United States. When a person arrested without a warrant is brought before
a commissioner or other officer, a complaint shall be filed forthwith. (b)
Statement by the Commissioner. The commissioner shall inform the de-
fendant of the complaint against him, of his right to retain counsel and of his
right to have a preliminary examination. He shall also inform the defendant
that he is not required to make a statement and that any statement made by
him may be used against him. The commissioner shall allow the defendant
reasonable time and opportunity to consult counsel and shall admit the de-
fendant to bail as provided in these rules." FED. R. CRim. P. 5.8 McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943).
" Upshaw v. United States, 335 U.S. 410 (1948).
Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957).
' Compare Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338 (1939), and Silver-
thorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920), where the "fruit
of the poisonous tree" idea is introduced with respect to wiretap evidence
and search and seizure.
' See note 2 supra.
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that an arrested person must be taken without unnecessary delay
before a commissioner or other officer for arraignment. The
McNabb-Mallory doctrine renders invalid in federal courts any con-
fession obtained during an unnecessary delay before arraignment.'
The principal case makes a significant extension of the scope and
spirit of this exclusionary rule by holding that a confession taken
after proper arraignment can also be inadmissible if it is not inde-
pendent of invalid pre-arraignment admission.
Neither the McNabb-Mallory line of decisions nor the principal
case rests on constitutional grounds.'0 This exclusionary rule is a
product of the Supreme Court's supervisory power over the lower
federal courts." The purpose of the rule is to enforce the congres-
sional requirement of prompt arraignment by excluding evidence
gained by its violation, and to prevent police from using unwarranted
detention to extract confessions by methods "easily gliding into the
evils of 'the third degree.' ,12
Under both the McNabb-Mallory doctrine and its extension in
Killough the confession may be completely voluntary and yet in-
admissible.'" Thus, in pre-arraignment confessions the key factor
in determining admissibility is whether or not the confession came
during a period of unnecessary delay. When, as in Killough, a post-
arraignment confession follows an invalid pre-arraignment confes-
' This rule does not apply to state criminal prosecutions. Brown v. Allen,
344 U.S. 443, 476 (1953); Gallegos v. Nebraska, 342 U.S. 55, 64 (1951).
'Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957) ; Upshaw v. United States,
335 U.S. 410 (1948); McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 322 (1943). See
generally Hogan & Snee, The McNabb-Mallory Rule: Its Rise, Rationale
and Rescue, 47 GEo. L.J. 1 (1958). The McNabb-Mallory rule has met with
much criticism. E.g., Inbau, The Confession Dilemma in the United States
Supreme Court, 43 ILL. L. REv. 442 (1948); Comment, 42 Micu. L. REv. 679(1944). Such criticism would also apply to an extension of the rule.
10 "No one even suggests that any right under the constitution is involved."
Killough v. United States, No. 16398, D.C. Cir., Oct. 4, 1962, at 25 (dissent).
Compare Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), where evidence obtained by
illegal search and seizure was held inadmissible in state courts on constitu-
tional grounds.
1 1McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943).
12 Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449, 453 (1957) ; See 47 VA. L. REv.
884 (1961).3 Upshaw v. United States, 335 U.S. 410 (1948); Killough v. United
States, No. 16398, D.C. Cir., Oct. 4, 1962. An involuntary confession is
inadmissible in federal courts under the fifth amendment. Brain v. United
States, 168 U.S. 532 (1897). The fourteenth amendment renders invalid
an involuntary confession in state criminal prosecutions. Lisenba v. Cali-
fornia, 314 U.S. 219 (1941); Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227 (1940);
Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
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sion the criteria of admissibility is whether or not the second is
independent of the first. 4
The principal case attempts to prevent police from obtaining a
confession by violating McNabb-Mallory, yet reaping all the benefits
by a reaffirmation following arraignment.15 Too often the reaffirma-
tion will be a mere mechanical act 6 by a prisoner who, having con-
fessed, can see no harm in repeating what he has already said. The
Court recognized this problem in United States v. Bayer'4 when it
stated:
[A] fter an accused has once let the cat out of the bag by con-
fessing, no matter what the inducement, he is never there-
after free of the psychological and practical disadvantages of
having confessed. He can never get the cat back in the bag.
The secret is out for good. In such a sense, a later confession
always may be looked upon as a fruit of the first.
Thus in order to preserve the McNabb-Mallory rule it is necessary to
curb in some degree the use of post-arraignment confessions.
As a possible solution it has been suggested that the defendant's
second confession should not be allowed unless it clearly appears that
he knew that his first confession was not admissible against him.' 8
This test would do much to prevent police circumvention of McNabb-
Mallory. But this solution is inadequate since the arraigning magis-
trate cannot conclusively determine the admissibility of the first
confession and is, therefore, not in a position to give the prisoner a
positive warning, 19 nor can the police be expected to so warn him.
When faced with this problem the court cannot lay down an inflexible
rule but must look at the totality of the circumstances in each case. 20
The court must weigh certain factors and determine whether the
" Killough v. United States, supra note 13 (concurring opinion).
1 In Killough the majority quotes a portion of the record from Naples
v. United States, 307 F.2d 618 (D.C. Cir. 1962), in which police admitted
that a post-arraignment reaffirmation was obtained for fear that the first
confession would be excluded under McNabb-Mallory. The case was reversed
on other grounds.
"In Jackson v. United States, 273 F.2d 521 (D.C. Cir. 1959), the de-
fendant merely signed a typewritten copy of an invalid oral confession.
" 331 U.S. 532, 540 (1947).
18 McCoRMIcK, EVIDENCE § 114,, at 237 (1954) ; Note, 26 TEXAs L. REV.
536 (1948).
19Note, 70 YALE L.J. 298, 304 n.30 (1960).
20 This is the court's procedure in determining whether a confession is
involuntary and thus a violation of due process. Payne v. Arkansas, 356
U.S. 560 (1958); Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227 (1940).
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second confession can be considered separate from and independent
of the first.
One of the factors to be considered is the time between arraign-
ment and the second confession. Jackson v. United States2 held a
post-arraignment confession invalid because it was not independent
of the pre-arraignment confession. Here the defendant made an oral
confession which was invalid under McNabb-Mallory. He was then
arraigned and immediately returned to police headquarters where
within one hour he signed a typewritten copy of his prior confes-
sion. Defendant had no chance to consult counsel. The typewritten
confession was held inadmissible because it could not be considered
an independent act based upon proper counsel or occurring after
time for deliberate reflection. On the other hand, United States v.
Bayer22 holds that a confession invalid under McNabb does not per-
petually bar the defendant from making an admissible subsequent
confession. Here the confession came six months after the first and
was admitted.
It would seem that no minimum time can be set. More time may
be necessary where defendant was actually a victim of physical or
mental coercion before arraignment." Thus the court should deter-
mine from all the circumstances whether there was sufficient time
for defendant to grasp the significance of the magistrate's warning.
A second factor to be considered is whether or not the defendant
had the advice of counsel before making his second confession. Lack
of counsel should not of itself destroy the second confession, since
the prisoner has had judicial instruction as to his rights.2" How-
ever, advice by counsel in addition to a magistrate's warning should
make a defendant well aware of his rights and tend to show an in-
dependent confession. In both Goldsmith v. United States25 and
Jackson v. United States26 the holding that a second confession was
independent, and therefore admissible, turned largely on the presence
and advice of counsel. In Goldsmith defendant's invalid pre-arraign-
21273 F.2d 521 (D.C. Cir. 1959).
"2331 U.S. 532 (1947).
28 Under McNabb-Mallory the pre-arraignment confession need not actu-
ally be involuntary so there may be no coercive influence to carry over to
the second confession. Note, 70 YALE L.J. 298 (1960). Compare Thomas
v. Arizona, 356 U.S. 390 (1958); Lyons v. Oklahoma, 322 U.S. 596 (1944).
"
4 FED. R. CRim. P. 5 (b).2277 F.2d 335 (D.C. Cir. 1960), 74 HAIv. L. Rnv. 1222 (1961).
28 285 F.2d 675 (D.C. Cir. 1960). This is the second appeal of Jackson v.
United States, 273 F.2d 521 (1959), 47 VA. L. R v. 884 (1961).
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ment confessions were reaffirmed only one hour after proper arraign-
ment. However during this hour defendant had a fifteen minute
consultation with an attorney. In Jackson the defendant was ar-
raigned on Sunday and the admissible affirmation of his confession
occurred on Tuesday. Defendant had benefit of consultation with
his attorney and consented in writing to the Tuesday interview with
the police.-"
A spontaneous or unsolicited confession or affirmation should
also weigh heavily in determining if the second confession is inde-
pendent of the first.2" While it is true that the defendant may be
facing police who know his secret, it would seem that an unsolicited,
spontaneous admission would likely be independent of the first
confession.
The person to whom the second confession is made should also
be considered. 9 If the reaffirmation is made to officers who heard
the invalid first confession the problem of the prisoner's psychological
disadvantage is clearly present.30 Conversely, if the second con-
fession is to one whom the prisoner knows or believes is not aware of
the first confession, this should raise an inference of independence.
Additional factors to be considered include the age, background and
mental capacity of the defendant,3" and whether he gave the officer
hearing the second confession permission to visit his jail cell., 2
Absence of counsel and brevity of time seem to be the main ele-
ments relied on by the majority of the court in Killough. Indeed, if
the spirit of the majority is followed advice of counsel seems to be
almost a prerequisite of independence. On the other hand, it seems
clear that the majority does not accord much weight to the judicial
warning given to the prisoner. Considering all of the circumstances
in the principal case the court made a very liberal determination of
the lack of independence of the confession in question. In fact, aside
2 The court in Killough distinguishes the present case mainly on the
fact that the defendant had no advice of counsel. However, four judges
intimate they would overrule Goldsmith and the second Jackson case if neces-
sary A fifth urges that they be overruled.; Goldsmith v. United States, 277 F.2d 335 (D.C. Cir. 1960). Cf. Stroble
v. California, 343 U.S. 181, 191 (1952).
2" In Killough the second confession was made to an officer who had heard
the first. Cf. Jackson v. State, 209 Md. 390, 121 A.2d 242 (1956).
"0 See note 17 supra and accompanying text.
"' Cf. Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227 (1940).




from lack of counsel, most of the circumstances would seem to indi-
cate an independent confession.
In confession cases the court is faced with the problem of the
balancing of civil liberties with the need for effective police pro-
tection." The idea of a coerced confession is abhorrent. On the
other hand, the guilty should not escape punishment because of a
mere technicality. In the principal case individual rights are weighed
heavily at the expense of police effectiveness. If the spirit of this
decision is followed the McNabb-Mallory rule is clearly in no danger
of being circumvented by post-arraignment police activities.
CHARLES M. WHEDBEE
Criminal Procedure-Continuance
It is the policy of the law that controversies should be settled as
speedily as possible.1 In criminal cases this right is guaranteed to
the accused by the constitution.' However, undue speed may often
work as much or more injustice as unnecessary delay.' To insure a
prisoner adequate time to prepare his defense a continuance may
often be necessary. In a criminal trial in North Carolina the grant-
ing or denial of a motion for a continuance of a case to another term
or until later in the same term is a decision which rests within the
sound discretion of the trial judge.4 Normally continuance of a
criminal case is not favored.5
The statutory pattern for continuance of any cause is extremely
broad.6 Generally, continuances may be granted if the judge is
satisfied that though the applicant has diligently prepared his case,
it would be impossible for the moving party to have a fair trial at
the present term for reasons beyond his control. No universal
enumeration of the grounds for a continuance is possible, since the
sufficiency of the cause is dependent upon and interwoven with the
" See Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449, 453 (1957).
'Piedmont Wagon Co. v. Bostic, 118 N.C. 758, 24 S.E. 525 (1896).
'U.S. CoNsT. amend. VI.
'State v. Creech, 229 N.C. 662, 677, 51 S.E.2d 348, 359 (1949) (dissent).
' State v. Flowers, 244 N.C. 77, 92 S.E.2d 447 (1956); State v. Ipock,
242 N.C. 119, 86 S.E.2d 798 (1955); State v. Hackney, 240 N.C. 230, 81
S.E.2d 778 (1954).
' State v. Gibson, 229 N.C. 497, 50 S.E.2d 520 (1948).
'N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 1-175 to -176 (1950), as amended, N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 1-175 (Supp. 1961).
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facts of the case.7 No appeal will lie from continuing a cause, and
in the case of an order refusing continuance, the court will not
reverse unless the judge has plainly abused his discretion.'
An exception to this general rule applies when the motion for
continuance is based upon the constitutional rights of the accused
to confront his accuser and to have representation of counsel.' When
based upon a constitutional right, the motion ceases to be a matter
of discretion and becomes a question of law, and appeal will lie from
a refusal to grant the motion.' 0 In the recent case of State v. Lane1
the defendant was indicted for a crime against nature. The judge
on his own motion appointed counsel for the indigent accused at
10:30 A.M. The case was tried at 2:30 P.M. on the same day.
Counsel moved for a continuance contending that he had not had
adequate time to prepare the defense. The motion was denied and
the defendant was convicted.' 2 On appeal the court, in reversing,
found that the defendant was entitled to a reasonable time in which
to prepare the case, and on the record it could not be said that this
opportunity had been afforded.
'Common grounds for the request for a continuance are: (1) absence
of counsel for good cause, State v. Lea, 203 N.C. 13, 164 S.E. 737, cert.
denied sub nor., Davis v. North Carolina, 287 U.S. 649 (1932); (2) physical
or mental incapacity of the accused, State v. Ipock, 242 N.C. 119, 86 S.E.2d
798 (1955) ; (3) absence of a witness or evidence, State v. Parker, 234 N.C.
236, 66 S.E.2d 907 (1951), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 825 (1952) ; (4) want of
preparation on the part of counsel, State v. Parker, supra. The cases set
forth are hardly exclusive. See generally 22A C.J.S. Criminal Law §§ 480-
529 (1961); Annot., 84 A.L.R. 544 (1933).
8 State v. Lindsey, 78 N.C. 499 (1878).
*N.C. CoNsT. art. I, § 11; U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV. The right to
counsel and the right of confrontation are closely interrelated. North v.
People, 139 Ill. 81, 28 N.E. 996 (1891). The right to confrontation carries
with it the right to face the accuser and the opportunity to prepare a defense.
State v. Garner, 203 N.C. 361, 166 S.E. 180 (1932) ; State v. Ross, 193 N.C.
25, 136 S.E. 193 (1927). The right to counsel includes the right of that
counsel to confer with witnesses and to prepare a defense. Powell v. Ala-
bama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932). A defendant may not be brought to trial until
the right of confrontation has been met, and the duty to appoint counsel is
not discharged by the assignment of counsel at such time as to preclude the
giving of effective aid. Commonwealth v. O'Keefe, 298 Pa. 169, 148 At. 73
(1929).
" State v. Farrell, 223 N.C. 321, 26 S.E.2d 322 (1943).
11258 N.C. 349, 128 S.E.2d 389 (1962).
12 In fairness to the trial judge, it should be borne in mind that at the time
of the trial the defendant, under Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942), had
no right to court appointed counsel. The judge may have felt that having
done the defendant the favor of appointing counsel in the first place, he was
not obligated to go further and also allow a continuance. Betts v. Brady was
overruled in March, 1963, by Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
The trial here was held in March 1962.
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Prior to State v. Lane the exception to the continuance rule had
never been applied to a non-capital felony, the facts sufficient to raise
the exception having been found only in capital cases where, because
of special circumstances, it was found that counsel did not have
time in which to prepare the case. Thus in North Carolina the
accused may now appeal the denial of a continuance of any felony
case when the motion is properly based upon the right to adequate
preparation of his defense. The case is also significant because it
illustrates the increasing willingness of the court to look at the
entire circumstances of a case with a view toward determining
whether on the whole record the defendant has had a fair opportunity
to prepare his defense.
The case which first articulated the exception to the continuance
rule in North Carolina was State v. Farrell.13 In Farrell the de-
fendant was charged with rape. Counsel was appointed on Satur-
day. The following Monday counsel asked for time to have a psy-
chiatrist examine the defendant. When the case was called on
Thursday the defendant moved for a continuance, contending that
a complete psychiatric examination could not be obtained, and that
family and friends were far away and could not be reached. Sup-
porting letters to this effect were produced. The motion for con-
tinuance was denied and the defendant was found guilty. On appeal
the court said that if the issue had been guilt or innocence, ample
time had been allowed. But since the defense was insanity, three
days for preparation and investigation was insufficient, thereby vio-
lating the right of the defendant to confrontation and effectively
denying the right to counsel. The question was whether the defend-
ant had a fair opportunity to prepare his defense, not the merits of
the particular defense.
Following Farrell the court was called upon to decide the same
issue in State v. Gibson.4  In Gibson the defendant was indicted
for rape. Counsel was appointed at the arraignment and the trial
was scheduled for the next day. Counsel immediately moved for
a continuance stating that he did not have ample time to prepare
the case, and that the defendant should be given a complete mental
examination. Counsel could neither state the names of witnesses he
wished to call nor any special defense which he intended to use.
The motion was denied and the defendant was convicted and sen-
13223 N.C. 321, 26 S.E.2d 322 (1943).1, 229 N.C. 497, 50 S.E.2d 520 (1948).
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tenced to death. On appeal the court stated that every man was
entitled to counsel and that this would amount to nothing if sufficient
time were not allowed for preparation of the defense. However, in
this case the defendant did not support his motion by affidavit or
other proof. The court found that the suggestions of counsel did
not indicate the existence of any substantial reason for the requested
postponement, and that while counsel hinted at insanity, he did not
advise the trial court that such a defense was contemplated. A mere
intangible hope that something helpful might turn up was found to
be no basis for delaying the trial since the record failed to show that
the continuance would enable counsel to obtain additional evidence
or otherwise present a stronger defense.15
The court in Gibson completely ignored the statement in Farrell
that the merits of the defense were not in question and that the only
inquiry was whether the defendant had a fair opportunity to prepare
a defense. The court seemingly required that counsel have the de-
fense prepared immediately upon his appointment, ignoring the fact
that counsel had been appointed for that very purpose. The court
in Gibson obviously begs the question of the fair opportunity to
prepare the case which was the basis of the Farrell decision.'"
Despite the limited interpretation placed by the Gibson decision
on the manner and circumstances in which the exception to the con-
tinuance rule may be raised, there has been a trend toward the
rationale of Farrell in subsequent cases.17  The court recently stated
that while there is no rule that a case may not be tried in the same
term as the indictment is rendered, except under certain circum-
stances in capital cases "the more speedily a case is brought to trial,
after the offense has been committed or arrest made, the greater the
15Id. at 502, 50 S.E.2d at 524.
10 In 1949 following Gibson the Legislature enacted N.C. GEIN. STAT.
§ 15-4.1 (1950), which was designed to implement the right of confrontation,
N.C. CONsT. art. I, § 11. State v. Simpson, 243 N.C. 436, 90 S.E.2d 708
(1956). The statute provides that in any capital case where the appointment
of counsel is delayed until the term of court at which the accused is arraigned,
on motion of counsel for the accused, the case shall be continued until the
next ensuing term of criminal court.
17 See, e.g., State v. Speller, 230 N.C. 345, 53 S.E.2d 294 (1949), where
the court reversed the denial of a motion for a continuance when a special
venire drawn from outside the county was impaneled without prior notice
to either side. In a dissenting opinion in State v. Creech, 229 N.C. 662, 677,
51 S.E.2d 348, 359 (1949), Justice Barnhill stated that while the motion for
continuance was not technically within the rule of Farrell, undue haste (one
day in a murder trial), particularly in this type of case, would pervert jus-
tice as surely as unnecessary delay would defeat it.
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duty of the courts to determine whether or not the accused has had
a fair opportunity for trial."'In the principal case the court followed Farrell in a per curiam
opinion. The court not only extended the doctrine to include non-
capital felonies but also allowed the exception to be taken upon an
oral motion for continuance. The case represents a significant break
from the technical distinctions laid down in Gibson with respect to
the sufficiency of the allegations necessary to come within the doc-
trine of State v. 1arrell.19
While the principal case provides a more liberal approach to the
request for a continuance of a criminal action on constitutional
grounds, it should be remembered that in order to take advantage
of this doctrine counsel must prepare an adequate basis for the
appeal.20 It is always necessary to allege that constitutional rights
were violated in order to preserve the appeal and come within the
exception ;2 otherwise, the court will treat the motion as one within
the discretion of the trial judge and will not normally reverse.22
Preferably the record must be made to show that the continuance
would enable counsel to obtain additional evidence or otherwise pre-
sent a stronger defense.23 The statutory scheme of continuance must
be followed as nearly as possible, particularly in having written
statements and evidence, names and addresses of witnesses, and all
other possible defenses which might be urged.24
" State v. Graves, 251 N.C. 550, 559, 112 S.E.2d 85, 92 (1960).
0 Counsel for the accused in Lane made an oral motion for a continuance
as did counsel for the accused in Gibson. The defense offered was much
less compelling than that offered by counsel in Gibson. The defense pro-
pounded in Lane was that defendant could not have been guilty of a crime
against nature per anum as alleged in the indictment because the defendant
had been rendered impotent as a result of the use of a "whammey," the filler
contained in a nasal inhaler.
20 State v. Farrell, 223 N.C. 321, 26 S.E.2d 322 (1943).
21 The speed of the trial does not necessarily constitute a denial of due
process. State v. Hedgebeth, 228 N.C. 259, 45 S.E.2d 563 (194.7). No stand-
ard length of time must elapse before a defendant should go on trial. Each
case and its surrounding circumstances provides its own yardstick. United
States v. Nierstheimer, 166 F.2d 87 (7th Cir. 1948).
2" State v. Creech, 229 N.C. 662, 51 S.E.2d 348 (1949).
2" State v. Gibson, 229 N.C. 497, 50 S.E.2d 520 (1948).
"2 Note the similarity of the requirement for the motion as stated in
Gibson to the requirements of the ordinary continuance as set out in G.S.
§§ 1-175 to -176.
It has been held that there was no denial of due process in refusing a
continuance where a fingerprint expert could not be present at the trial, State
v. Rising, 223 N.C. 747, 28 S.E.2d 221 (1943), or where witnesses sought
to be subpoenaed could not be named by the prisoner, State v. Hackney, 240
N.C. 230, 81 S.E.2d 788 (1954), or where the defendant was merely without
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Additional significance is added to the principal case by the de-,
cision of the United States Supreme Court, in Gideon v. Wain-
wright 5 where the Court decreed that counsel must be provided in
criminal cases.26 Since all accused now have the right to counsel,
the corollary right to adequate opportunity to prepare the defense
is also extended. While State v. Lane and Gideon v. Wainwright
are large steps forward in the protection of the rights of those
accused of non-capital crimes, there are many problems which remain
unanswered. The courts have the duty both to provide the defendant
a speedy trial and to clear overcrowded trial dockets. A continuance
in every case could frustrate the speed of justice and cause adminis-
trative turmoil and unnecessary delay. On the other hand, appoint-
ment of counsel to represent indigent defendants will involve all
members of the bar, including those who do not deal primarily with
criminal cases. As a result continuance to allow proper preparation
by attorneys will be essential in carrying out the purposes of such
an appointment.
As the principal case held, the immediate solution to the problem
has been to make the denial of continuance appealable. The most
obvious alternative solution to the problem would be a statute similar
to G.S. § 15-4.1 which would provide for an automatic continuance,
in proper circumstances, upon motion of counsel. However, statu-
tory procedures alone can never fully satisfy due process in every
case. Ultimately the solution must lie in an increased awareness of
this problem and a sympathetic treatment of the indigent by the trial
judiciary. It is believed that the trial judges, having been apprised
of the problem as presented in the principal case, are equal to the
task. Tom D. EFIRD
Damages-Collateral Source Rule-Pensions as Reducing Factor on
Personal Injury
In Browning v. The War Office1 the English Court of Appeal
considered the question of reducing an award for damages by the
friends or relatives nearby to be at the trial to testify in his behalf, State v.
Hedgebeth, 228 N.C. 259, 45 S.E.2d 563 (1947).25 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
2 8In Gideon v. Wainwright the Court did not expressly extend the deci-
sion to cover all criminal prosecutions, but certainly all felonies are included
within the rule.
, Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
[1963] 2 Weekly L R. 52 (C.A.).
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-amount of a disability pension which the plaintiff was receiving.
Plaintiff, a sergeant in the United States Air Force, lost his arm
in an automobile collision while stationed in England. The injury
resulted in his-discharge and an award of a disability pension amount-
ing to nearly one-half of the salary he had been receiving. Plaintiff's
-claim for recovery was predicated on his loss of earnings,, and the
trial court awarded damages without considering the pension. Here-
tofore, the leading English case on the subject had held that pensions
were in that class of collateral sources along with plaintiff's insurance
and gifts which do not go to mitigate loss of earnings.2 But on
appeal, in Browning, the court held that this precedent had been
overruled- and that pensions were the equivalent of earnings and
were allowed to mitigate damages.
With this decision England has adopted a purely compensatory
theory of damages whereby the aim is to compensate the injured
party for the loss of earnings sustained, and nothing more. This
theory is based on the logic that no matter how serious the actual
injury is to the plaintiff in terms of lost income, the defendant should
not be required to compensate plaintiff for more than the difference
in income prior to the injury and income from both earnings and
collateral sources after the injury. For example, in the present case
plaintiff was receiving 450 dollars a month in earnings prior to the
injury. After the injury, and the termination of his regular salary,
plaintiff began to receive 217 dollars a month as a disability benefit
from the United States government. Some courts might say that
the plaintiff was injured in the amount of 450 dollars a month by
'In Payne v. Railway Executive, [1952] 1 K.B. 26, the English court had
held that pension payments to which a serviceman was entitled could not be
considered when figuring pecuniary loss, especially since the pension could
be reduced after the judgment at the discretion of the authorities.
'The court held that Payne v. Railway Executive had been overruled by
British Transp. Comm'n v. Gourley [1956] 2 Weekly L.R. 41. Gourley dealt
exclusively with the question of taxes being considered in figuring damages.
The court held taxes a valid consideration in the computation of pecuniary
loss for personal injury, stating that damages should compensate and not
punish. Now, by analogy, the court decides that to award plaintiff damages
for losses which are covered by disability pensions would be to punish the
defendant.
The Gourley case itself is contrary to the predominant American view
regarding taxes. E.g., Stokes v. United States, 144 F.2d 82 (2d Cir. 1944) ;
Atlantic Coast Line Ry. v. Brown, 93 Ga. App. 805, 92 S.E.2d 874 (1956);
Dempsey v. Thompson, 363 Mo. 339, 251 S.W.2d 42 (1952). These cases gen-
erally hold that the income tax savings should not be considered when fixing
damages for loss of earnings because of personal injuries. Contra, Floyd v.
Fruit Indus., Inc., 144 Conn. 659, 136 A.2d 918 (1957).
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losing his status in the Air Force. But by applying the compensa-
tory theory and taking into consideration the income from the col-
lateral source the court in Browning concluded that the plaintiff's
injury was 233 dollars per month and not 450 dollars.
Not all income from collateral sources will reduce defendants'
liability. Such items as gratuitous payments from third parties,
insurance for which the plaintiff has paid, and those payments to
plaintiff which he must repay will not reduce the liability of the
defendant.4 It should be noted that these items are excluded because
of the particular circumstances of payment in each case, and for this
reason they are not recognized as mitigating in any jurisdictions.
This is the class of payments in which England previously held
disability benefits to exist until the principal case. Browning re-
moved disability payments from this list of exceptions in computing
loss of earnings.
The opinion of the court advances two reasons for this result.
First, most recoveries of this kind are paid by defendant's insurance
companies who in turn increase their premium charges to the general
public. These increased insurance rates cause the amount of such
recoveries to be borne by the general public, and this is against public
policy.6 Second, actual damages are not awarded to punish the
.wrongdoer; liability only accrues when the wrongdoer causes damage
and this damage is all that should be recompensed.'
'E.g., Publix Cab Co. v. Colorado Nat'l Bank, 139 Colo. 205, 338 P.2d 702
(1959) (insurance payments); Drinkwater v. Dinsmore, 80 N.Y. 390, 36 Am.
Rep. 624 (1880) (gratuity); Nelson v. Western Steam Nav. Co., 52 Wash.
177, 100 Pac. 325 (1909) (gratuitous medical services).
England still recognizes this class of exceptions. E.g., Bradburn v.
Great W. Ry., L.R. 10 Ex. 1 (1874) (insurance benefits which plaintiff has
bought with his own money); Redpath v. Belfast & County Down Ry.,
[1947] No. Ire. L.R. 167 (charitable gifts); Dennis v. London Passenger
Transp. Bd., 64 T.L.R. 269 (1948); Schneider v. Eisovitch, [1960] 2 Q.B.
430 (payments by third persons which plaintiff has undertaken to repay).
'Browning v. The War Office, [1963] 2 Weekly L.R. at 60-61.
'In a very learned discussion Diplock, L.J. says: "A person who acts
without reasonable care does no wrong in law; he commits no tort. He
only does wrong, he only commits a tort, if his lack of care causes damage to
the plaintiff. A defendant in an action for negligence is not a wrongdoer
at large; he is a wrongdoer only in respect of the damage which he actually
causes to the plaintiff. Thus in relation to damages for negligence, to speak
of the wrongdoer appropriating to himself the benefit of some fortuitous cir-
cumstance which has in fact reduced the loss which the plaintiff might other-
wise have sustained as a result of the defendant's negligence involves what
I respectfully think is an erroneous approach to the problem. Implicit in
such a statement is the tacit assumption that there is some norm of damages
which a defendant who has acted without reasonable care ought to pay for
his careless act, even though owing to some circumstances for which the
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In spite of the force of this reasoning, the majority of the Ameri-
can courts hold that pensions, whether being paid at present or antici-
pated in the future, should not be considered in assessing damages.,
Such holdings are based on the theory that the defendant should
not benefit from a collateral income which the plaintiff receives, even
if the total income after the injury exceeds income prior to the injury.
The rule supported by this reasoning is called the "collateral source
rule" and is stated as follows: "total or partial compensation for an
injury received from a collateral source wholly independent of the
wrongdoer will not operate to lessen the damages recoverable from
the responsible party."' The "collateral source rule" grows directly
from the punitive theory of damages which stresses the punishment
of the defendant.' 0 Consequently there is a qualification of the rule
that only those payments made wholly independent of the wrongdoer
shall not mitigate. If the wrongdoer has contributed to the collateral
funds then the amount of his liability will be reduced by the amount
of his contribution. This reduction in liability is readily illustrated
by the calculation of damages in suits against the United States
government brought by its employees. Disability pensions paid by
the government to servicemen are a mitigating factor since the gov-
ernment, as wrongdoer, has made the payments.'" The disability
defendant is not directly responsible the plaintiff has not in fact suffered a loss
corresponding to the norm." [1963] 2 Weekly L.R. at 62.8 E.g., Price v. United States, 179 F. Supp. 309 (E.D. Va. 1959); Hume
v. Lacey, 112 Cal. App. 2d 147, 245 P.2d 672 (1952); Mullins v. Bolinger,
115 Ind. App. 167, 55 N.E.2d 381 (1944) ; Rusk v. Jefferies, 110 N.J.L. 307,
164 Atl. 313 (1933); Heath v. Seattle Taxicab Co., 73 Wash. 177, 131 Pac.
843 (1913). But see Brooks v. United States, 337 U.S. 49 (1949) where the
Court concluded that payments through servicemen's disability pensions
should be considered when the government is the defendant and will pay its
liability under the Federal Tort Claims Act.
See 15 Am. Jur. Damages § 198 (1938).
"0 "There is, in addition to the compensatory aspect, a punitive one, a
notion that the defendant's moral fault subjects him to liability. The theory
of compensation stresses that the plaintiff must be paid; the punitive theory,
that the defendant must pay. Such a view of civil damages gives them the
function of criminal sanctions: to enforce adherence to set standards of con-
duct. But this function, although desirable, is not generally accepted as the
primary purpose of the civil action. A consequence of the punitive aspect
of damages is the 'collateral source rule.' Since liability for damages is often
considered inherent in the wrong, any mitigation of those damages, it is said,
would be a benefit to the defendant-a windfall. Therefore, courts generally
refuse to reduce damages where the plaintiff's loss has been (or will be)
compensated from some source collateral to the defendant's wrong." 63 HARV.
L. REv. 330, 331 (1949).
' See Tessier v. United States, 164 F. Supp. 779 (D.C. Mass.), aff'd,
269 F.2d 305 (1st Cir. 1959); Wuth v. United States, 161 F. Supp. 661 (E.D.
Va. 1958). This mitigation has been granted where the pensions are merely
1963]
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benefits are not received from a source wholly independent of the
wrongdoer and the collateral source doctrine does not apply. On the
other hand, civil service benefits are not a mitigating factor between
,the employees and the government since the employees contribute
to the funds from which benefits are paid.12 The benefits from these
funds are wholly independent of the wrongdoer and therefore the
"collateral source rule" applies.
It is obvious that the normal application of the collateral source
doctrine results in a windfall to the plaintiff. And, if the reasoning
of the English court is correct, how do the majority of American
courts justify the rule that disability pensions will not go to mitigate
a defendant's liability?"s The dissent in Browning expresses the
predominant American conclusion that pensions, such as the one in
the present case, are earned by the injured party's past services and
therefore are analogous to insurance payments.14  These insurance
payments (or pensions) having come from a collateral source wholly
independent of the wrongdoer should be excluded from the computa-
tion of defendant's liability. It is also pointed out in Browning that
disability pensions would be payable whether there was a tort or
not.'5 The single precedent to their payment is merely the occur-
rence of a disabling injury. Logic is conspicuous by its absence
when such payments are considered as compensation for the loss of
earnings inflicted by a tort.
In addition to the above reasoning there would seem to be
another strong argument for refusing reduction of loss by disability
pensions. In cases where these payments are being made, someone,
.either plaintiff or defendant, is going to profit from these collateral
payments whether they be considered as gratuities, insurance, or
earnings. Provided that the defendant is not in a position to pass
the loss to other parties,'6 it would seem to be the better reasoned
a likelihood or have actually been received. Snyder v. United States, 118
F. Supp. 585 (D.C. Md. 1953).
" See Price v. United States, 179 F. Supp. 309 (E.D. Va. 1959).
"Hume v. Lacey, 112 Cal. App. 2d 147, 245 P.2d 672 (1952); Ring v.
Minneapolis St. Ry., 176 Minn. 377, 223 N.W. 619 (1929); Texas Cities
Gas Co. v. Dickens, 156 S.W.2d 1010 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941); Cunnien v.
Superior Iron Works Co., 175 Wis. 172, 184 N.W. 767 (1921).[1963] 2 Weekly L.R. at 61.
15 Ibid.
'°It would seem that many potential defendants are in such a position.
Most private persons are covered by insurance of some type, while large




judgment to allow the plaintiff and not the defendant to profit. The
culpability of the defendant should bar his receiving a windfall- which
on the other hand would go to an innocent party.
North Carolina, like England, feels that compensation from col-
lateral sources should go to the mitigation of damages where it would
be unjust or inequitable to hold otherwise. 7 However, we have
not reached the point of allowing receipt of pensions by the injured
party to reduce the award of damages where the defendant was not
paying that pension." In Bryant v. Woodlief" the court, although
dealing with the problem of damages for wrongful death and not
personal injury, held that railroad retirement benefits which deceased
was receiving at time of death should be considered in computing the
damages for the wrongful death. In Bryant the court made state-
ments to the effect that retirement pay and other income for life
would be considered in an action for wrongful death.20 However,
the court in wrongful death actions bases the damages upon the
pecuniary loss to the estate of the decedent. This represents that
amount which would have accrued to the estate of the deceased
through his own efforts had he lived his normal life span. In per-
sonal injury actions the liability for lost earnings is based on com-
pensating the plaintiff. These funds also should represent amounts
which the plaintiff would have earned through his own efforts had
he not been disabled. Perhaps, therefore, the analogy would be
drawn to the effect that compensation for disability includes loss of
future earnings which would have accrued to the estate of the de-
1 North Carolina is a compensation state as is seen from the language in
Broadway v. Cope, 208 N.C. 85, 179 S.E. 452 (1935): "[A]ward no damages
based upon speculation, or no damages based upon imagination; but you
would be confined to the rule of law which the court gave you; that is, com-
pensatory damages that actually flow, that proximately flow and are neces-
sary for the results... of the wrong done the plaintiff by the defendant.. .
Id. at 89, 179 S.E. at 455.
" In Lane v. Southern Ry., 192 N.C. 287, 134 S.E. 855 (1926) a nineteen
year old soldier sued for injuries resulting in amputation of part of his hand.
He was allowed damages of $15,000 which the court held were not excessive.
The question of reduction of liability for loss of earning capacity due to
government pension was not raised since disability provisions were not
enacted until four years after the action by the amending act of July 3, 1930
(ch. 849, 46 Stat. 995). This act was a departure from the theory upon which
past legislation was based in that it granted monetary benefits to veterans
whose disabilities were not the result of service in actual combat.
19252 N.'C. 488, 114 S.E.2d 241 (1960), 39 N.C.L. REV. 107 (1961).
o "We do not understand that the general rule in this respect would ex-
clude the inclusion of income from an annuity, life estate, retirement pay or
other income for life only, in arriving at the pecuniary loss sustained by rea-
son of wrongful death.' 252 NC. at 494, 114 S.E.2d at 246. - '
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ceased in a wrongful death action, adopting in effect the English
view of allowing mitigation of lost earnings by disability pensions.
However, the question of how far the court will extend the holding
in Bryant is still unanswered since this particular aspect of the
decision has not been relied upon in any decision since Bryant was
decided.21
As stated earlier, the American courts allow pensions paid by
the government to a serviceman to mitigate any recovery by the
serviceman against the United States. One of these federal court
decisions applied North Carolina law.22 In support of such a result,
the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals cited Holland v. Southern Public
Util. Co.,23 apparently relying on the following language of that
decision: "we think the weight of both authority and reason is to the
effect that any amount paid by anybody .... for and on account of
any injury or damage should be held for a credit on the total re-
covery in any action for the same injury or damage."24  This lan-
guage may indicate that our court will accept disability benefits as
an amount paid for and on account of an injury even though coming
from a third party. Undoubtedly, the acceptance of disability pen-
sions in reduction of damages in personal injury actions will find
strong support in the North Carolina cases when the question in its
purest form arises in this state.
It would seem highly inequitable to allow a tortfeasor to have a
reduction in liability because of mere chance or plaintiff's foresight.
But, it would appear that the plaintiff does not really "lose" those
earnings which are, in effect, guaranteed by third parties. North
Carolina has built a strong foundation for adopting the minority
view in regards to the compensation theory of damages. Moreover,
the court has indicated that it is not afraid to side with the minority
to expand our compensation theory where good judgment demands
it. 5 Regardless of which turn we take, when the question arises,
21 See 39 N.C.L. Rlv. 107 (1961).
United States v. Brooks, 176 F.2d 482 (4th Cir. 1949). It must be
remembered that this action involves one of those cases where the plaintiff
has been compensated in part by the defendant and is an exception to the
general rule followed in the United States.23208 N.C. 289, 180 S.E. 592 (1935).
,This same reasoning has recently been followed in Ramsey v. Camp,
254 N.C. 443, 119 S.E.2d 209 (1961), which also involved the issue of re-
duction of damages by consideration given for a covenant not to sue by a
third party.
"2 See Tart v. Register, 257 N.C. 161, 125 S.E.2d 754 (1962). Here the
question was presented of recovery by the plaintiff for hospital and doctor's
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we may have to discard all analogies and decide the issue by looking
to the equities of the case.26
ARNOLD T. WOOD
Dedication-Acceptance of Streets in Subdivision-Public User
X, owner of a subdivision, sold lots therein by reference to a
recorded map which showed the location of the lots and streets. Y
owned a lot outside the subdivision upon which he built a home. He
then opened his driveway onto a street in the subdivision. Although
this subdivision street, which connected two public highways, had
been regularly used by Y and other members of the general public
for at least two years, it had never been accepted or maintained by
public authority. When X barricaded the street, cutting off access
to Y's driveway, Y obtained a mandatory injunction for reopening
the street. The North Carolina Supreme Court, in Owens v. Elliot,'
reversed. The court held that an effective dedication to the property
owners within the subdivision had been made, but as to the general
public there was only an offer of dedication, requiring formal accept-
ance by the proper public authorities before Y, as a member of the
general public, acquired a right to use the street.
When streets are shown on a recorded plat or map of a sub-
division two types of interests are created.2  First, purchasers of
bills which had been paid by the defendant under automobile medical pay-
ments insurance. The defendant's comprehensive insurance policy also con-
tained a liability clause for payment on behalf of defendant of any tort lia-
bility within policy limits. The medical payments clause called for payments
directly to injured persons regardless of the insured's negligence. The court,
after stating the majority view that recovery could be had under both clauses,
refused to allow a double recovery on the theory that there should be but
one recovery for one injury reghrdless of what the source of the compen-
sation.
8As stated by Lord Denning, M.R., in the principal case: "I prefer . . .
to discard . . . analogies and ask myself the simple question: is it fair and
just that, in assessing compensation, regard should be had to the fact that
Sergeant Browning is already, as of right, in receipt of nearly half his pay?
And my answer is, 'Yes.' He ought not receive compensation twice over.
If he had remained in the Air Force, he would not have received both his pay
and his pension. Nor should he do so now." [1963] 2 Weekly L.R. at 58.
1 258 N.C. 314, 128 S.E.2d 583 (1962). This case was before the court
on appeal in 257 N.C. 250, 125 S.E.2d 589 (1962), where a judgment for
damages was reversed. It was remanded to determine the injunction issue
in light of pertinent evidence.
2 See, e.g., Russell v. Coggin, 232 N.C. 674, 62 S.E.2d 70 (1950), where
the court stated, in effect, that when an owner subdivides and sells in refer-
ence to a plat or map, he dedicates the streets to the public in general and the
purchasers in particular. See generally 11 MCQUILLAN, MUNICIPAL Con-
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lots within the subdivision acquire a fixed right of ingress and egress
immediately upon conveyance, and the grantor is estopped to deny
them the use of the streets already laid out.3 Secondly, the general
public acquires an interest through dedication.4
In many states dedication of subdivision streets is usually accom-
plished by the recording of a plat or map of the subdivision in accord-
ance with an express statutory scheme.5 North Carolina has no
such statute.6 Consequently, dedication is accomplished here in
accordance with long-established common-law principles. By analogy
to the law of contracts a completed common-law dedication requires
PoRA-ToNs § 33.24 (3d ed. 1949) ; 4 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY § 1103 (3d ed.
1939).
'See 11 MCQUILLAN, op. cit. supra note 2, § 33.24; 4 TIFFANY, op. cit.
supra note 2, § 1103; 31 N.C.L. Rv. 202 (1953). It is generally agreed
by the courts and treatise writers that the purchasers' rights to the unimpeded
use of subdivision streets is not obtained by dedication, since technically
there can be no dedication except to the public. However, more often than
not this distinction is not made, and the purchasers' rights are loosely in-
cluded in the term dedication. There need not be acceptance in any manner
by the public or public' authorities for the purchaser to enforce his rights.
Broocks v. Muirhead, 223 N.C. 227, 25 S.E.2d 889 (1943).
'An Oregon case illustrates one court's distaste with this distinction.
"Many of the courts, in discussing this subject, have made too great an effort
to discriminate between such purchasers and the general public. The former
are not a distinct class from the latter; they belong to it; are as much a
part of the public as those who use the streets for the purposes of travel ....
[T]hey would, so far as I can see, represent the public in the affair as much
as a like number of wayfarers who travel upon such streets, and have equal
authority to accept a dedication of them for the public." Meier v. Portland
Cable Ry., 16 Ore. 500, 509, 19 Pac. 610, 615 (1888).
Dedication is generally defined as devotion of land to a public use by an
unequivocal act of the owner of the fee, manifesting an intention that it
shall be accepted and used presently or in the future. See, e.g., Manning v.
House, 211 Ala. 570, 100 So. 772 (1924); Whippoorwill Crest Co. v. Town
of Stratford, 145 Conn. 268, 141 A.2d 241 (1958); City of Miami Beach v.
Miami Beach Improvement Co., 153 Fla. 107, 14 So. 2d 172 (1943); City
of Kingman v. Wagner, 168 Kan. 558, 213 P.2d 979 (1950). See generally
11 McQuILLAN, op. cit. supra note 2, § 33.02.
'E.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 505.01 (1947). Even in those states with
statutory dedication there may still be common-law dedication. E.g., Louis-
ville & N.R.R. v. City of Owensboro, 238 S.W.2d 148 (Ky. 1951); City of
Hardin v. Ferguson, 271 Mo. 410, 196 S.W. 746 (1917).
The term dedication, of course, includes both the statutory and common-
law types. Where necessary to distinguish between the two it is generally
surmised that a statutory dedication operates in the nature of a grant of an
easement, while a common-law dedication operates by way of estoppel in
pais. See generally 1 ELLIOT, ROADS AND STREETS § 125 (4th ed. 1925) ; 11
MCQUILLAN, op. cit. supra note 2, § 33.03.
6 The only statute in North Carolina expressly dealing with the subject
merely provides a method of withdrawal of a street after it has been effec-
tively dedicated but not used within fifteen years of the dedication date. N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 136-96 (1958).
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an offer of dedication and' an acceptance by the public.7 The offer,
based on: the dedicator's objective intent, may be indicated in a num-
ber of ways.' One of the most widely acknowledged methods, with
which North Carolina is in full accord,' is by subdividing land and
making sales with reference to a recorded map or plat.10  The ma-
jority view is that a sale of lots in a subdivision settles the rights
between the seller and buyer, but, as to the general public, the offer
to dedicate remains revocable at will until there has been some act
of acceptance on the part of the public." In discussing the public
acceptance sufficient to complete dedication of subdivision streets, the
North Carolina court has stated the rule in various ways. Typically
it is said that the public acceptance must be in some "recognized legal
manner."' 2 This rule is deceptively simple due to the evasive mean-
" Gault v. Town of Lake Waccamaw, 200 N.C. 593, 158 S.E. 104 (1931) ;
Irwin v. City of Charlotte, 193 N.C. 109, 136 S.E. 368 (1927); Wittson v.
Dowling, 179 N.C. 542, 103 S.E. 18 (1920); Elizabeth City v. Commander,
176 N.C. 26, 96 S.E. 736 (1918); Green v. Miller, 161 N.C. 25, 76 S.E. 505
(1912). See generally 11 McQUILLAN, op. cit. supra note 2, § 33.43.
8 E.g., by written instrument expressly for that reason, Gallagher v. City
of Detroit, 262 Mich. 298, 247 N.W. 188 (1933); by recitals in a deed in
which the rights of the public are recognized, Neill v. Hake, 254 Minn. 110,
93 N.W.2d 821 (1958); by oral declarations, Seaboard Air Line Ry. v.
Dorsey, 111 Fla. 22, 149 So. 759 (1932); by affirmative acts of the owner
in connection with his property, Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Donalsonville
Grain & Elevator Co., 184 Ga. 291, 191 S.E. 87 (1937); by acquiescence of
the owner in the public use of his property for a public purpose, City of
Spokane v. Catholic Bishop of Spokane, 33 Wash. 2d 496, 206 P.2d 277
(1949).
'Town of Blowing Rock v. Gregorie, 243 N.C. 364, 90 S.E.2d 898
(1956); Hine v. Blumenthal, 239 N.C. 537, 80 S.E.2d 266 (1954); Lee v.
Walker, 234 N.C. 687, 68 S.E.2d 664 (1952); Foster v. Atwater, 226 N.C.
472, 38 S.E.2d 316 (1946); Evans v. Home, 226 N.C. 581, 39 S.E.2d 612
(1946); Broocks v. Muirhead, 223 N.C. 227, 25 S.E.2d 889 (1943); Home
Real Estate Loan & Ins. Co. v. Town of Carolina Beach, 216 N.C. 778, 7
S.E.2d 13 (1940); Somersette v. Stanaland, 202 N.C. 685, 163 S.E. 803
(1932). The rule announced in this line of cases is, in effect, that the process
of subdividing, platting, and selling lots in a subdivision amounts to a dedi-
cation of the streets therein to the use of the purchasers of such lots and
the general public.
"There is virtually no conflict among the jurisdictions on this point.
McQuillan calls it "one of the clearest ways of declaring an intention to
dedicate." 11 McQuILLAN, op. cit. supra note 2, § 33.30. But see 4 TIrFANY,
op. cit. supra note 2, § 1003, for a mild criticism.
" McQUILLAN, op. cit. supra note 2, § 33.45. Tiffany disagrees with
McQuillan and makes the statement that the weight of authority is that
once sales are made in reference to a plat, a dedication effected thereby can-
not be revoked even though there has been no indication of an acceptance by
the public. He criticizes this rule because it eliminates the necessity of
acceptance by the public. 4 TIFFANY, op. cit. supra note 2, § 1106. To be
sure, there is at least agreement that there is disagreement.
" Owens v. Elliot, 258 N.C. 314, 128 S.E.2d 583 (1962); Gault v. Town
1963]
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ing of the words "acceptance" and "recognized legal manner." This
evasiveness has led to a state of confusion in North Carolina con-
cerning public user'--one of the universally recognized modes of
acceptance, and the one relied on by the plaintiff in the Owens case.14
The usual modes of acceptance of an offer of dedication are'
(1) by formal or express acts of public authorities; (2) by implica-
tion from acts of public authorities; (3) by implication from user
by the public for the purpose for which the property was dedicated. 1
North Carolina has recognized these three methods,'0 but often the
third has been disregarded." Where there has been an attempt to
impose liability on a public authority for repairs and maintenance of
streets, no doubt the omission has been deliberate." In this context
public user is properly not a "recognized legal manner" of accept-
ance. Much of the confusion has been caused by the indiscriminate
application of this principle of non-recognition of public user to cases
in which imposition of liability on a public authority is not involved.'9
The principal case is a prime example.
It is generally held in North Carolina that a public highway, in
the sense that the public is responsible for its maintenance, may be
established only by (1) regularly instituted proceedings by public
authorities; (2) user by the public and control by public authorities
of Lake Waccamaw, 200 N.C. 593, 158 S.E. 104 (1931); Wright v. Town
of Lake Waccamaw, 200 N.C. 616, 158 S.E. 99 (1931).
"Although unable to find "public user" anywhere precisely defined, a
reading of numerous cases indicates that it can range from mere use of
dedicated land by members of the public, to public use with the additional
element of maintenance and repair by a public authority. Maintenance in
this context is carried on without any formal authorization and, therefore,
is also considered to be an ingredient of "public user."
' Brief for Plaintiff, pp. 2, 3.
" Town of Blowing Rock v. Gregorie, 243 N.C. 364, 90 S.E.2d 898
(1956), cited in 11 MCQuJILLAN, op. cit. supra note 2, § 33.47.
" Town of Blowing Rock v. Gregorie, supra note 15, at 367, 90 S.E.2d
at 901; Wittson v. Dowling, 179 N.C. 542, 545, 103 S.E. 18, 19 (1920).
"' Owens v. Elliot, 258 N.C. 314, 317, 128 S.E.2d 583, 586 (1962) ; Scott
v. Schackelford, 241 N.C. 738, 743, 86 S.E.2d 453, 457 (1955); Chesson v.
Jordan, 224 N.C. 289, 291, 29 S.E.2d 906, 908 (1944); Stewart v. Frink,
94 N.C. 487, 488 (1886) ; Kennedy v. Williams, 87 N.C. 6, 8 (1882).
"8 There is a split of authority as to whether mere public user is sufficient
to impose liability on a. public authority for repairs and maintenance. 11
McQuILLAN, op. cit. supra note 2, § 33.50; 4 TIFFANY, Op. cit. supra note 2,
§ 1107. McQuillan takes the stand that user should be sufficient, basing this
on the ground that the public is in realiiy the municipality, while the principal
officers are merely agents of the public. North Carolina has never decided
this point.
19 See note 18 supra.
[Vol. 41
NOTES AND COMMENTS
for twenty years; or (3) dedication by the owner with the sanction
of public authorities which have accepted it.2" When this rule is
coupled with the doctrine of acceptance of dedication by public user -
in a context other than an attempt to impose liability on the public for
maintenance, formal recognition of the latter rule is practically
vitiated.22 Upon analysis it becomes clear that the two rules are,
directed at different ends and should not be invariably construed
together. The rule of public user is directed toward the dedicator
and makes his offer of dedication irrevocable. The rule concerning
establishment of public highways is directed toward state agencies
and defines the manner in which a duty of public maintenance is
created. This duty carries with it tort liability for negligent failure to
properly maintain the street.23  But the creation of a right in the
public to use a dedicated street does not necessarily impose a con-
comitant duty on the public to maintain it.2" In such a case the
public is free to use the dedicated street as a public highway but at
2' Owens v. Elliot, 258 N.C. 314, 128 S.E.2d 583 (1962) ; Scott v. Shackel-
ford, 241 N.C. 738, 86 S.E.2d 453 (1955) ; Chesson v. Jordan, 224 N.C. 289,
29 S.E.2d 906 (1944); Hemphill v. Board of Aldermen, 212 N.C. 185, 193
S.E. 153 (1937); Stewart v. Frink, 94 N.C. 487 (1886); Kennedy v. Wil-
liams, 87 N.C. 6 (1882).
"1 In cases not involving streets in a subdivision North Carolina has recog-
nized user as a proper device for accepting a dedication. Draper v. Conner
& Walters Co., 187 N.C. 18, 121 S.E. 29 (1924); Penland v. Barnard, 146
N.C. 378, 59 S.E. 1109 (1907) ; Crump v. Mims, 64 N.C. 767 (1870).
2That the doctrine of user and this rule can exist together is not ques-
tioned. However, this is true only in contexts in which it was originally'
employed, that is, where the intent of the owner to dedicate is in issue. In-
tent, either express or implied through conduct, is the fundamental prerequi-
site of an offer to dedicate. Draper v. Conner & Walters Co., supra note 21.
"Savannah Beach, Tybee Island v. Drane, 205 Ga. 14, 52 S.E.2d 439
(1949); Richmond v. City of Marseilles, 154 IIl. App. 345 (1910); State v.
Wilson, 42 Me. 9 (1856); Kennedy v. City of Cumberland, 65 Md. 514, 9
Aft. 234 (1886); Chapman v. City of Sault Ste. Marie, 146 Mich. 23, 109
N.W. 53 (1906); Cincinnati & M.V.R.R. v. Village of Rosevill, 76 Ohio
St. 108, 81 N.E. 178 (1907); City of Winchester v. Carroll, 99 Va. 727, 40
S.E. 37 (1901); Pence v. Bryant, 54 W. Va. 263, 46 S.E. 275 (1903).
Contra, Makepeace v. City of Waterbury, 74 Conn. 360, 50 Atl. 876
(1902); City of Hammond v. Maher, 30 Ind. App. 286, 65 N.E. 1055
(1903); Dunn v. City of Oelwien, 140 Iowa 423, 118 N.W. 764 (1908);
Phelps v. City of Mankato, 23 Minn. 276 (1877); Benton v. City of St. Louis,
217 Mo. 687, 118 S.W. 418 (1909) ; Sweeney v. Village of Newport, 65 N.H.
86, 18 AtI. 86 (1889); Ackerman v. City of Williarrisport, 227 Pa. 591, 76
At. 421 (1910); City of Austin v. Ritz, 72 Tex. 291, 9 S.W. 884 (1888);
Cady v. City of Seattle, 42 Wash. 402, 85 Pac. 19 (1906).
2' Gilbreath v. City of Greensboro, 153 N.C. 396, 69 S.E. 268 (1910);
Jones v. Town of Henderson, 147 N.C. 120, 60 S.E. 894 (1908); State v.
Fisher, 117 N.C. 733, 23 S.E. 158 (1895).
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their 6wh risk.25 , Tort liability may be voluntarily assumed by the
municipality or public' authority but it cannot be forced upon them.
Another oft-used doctrine is that a person who purchases a lot
on the outside boundaries of a subdivision has no rights in respect
to the dedicated streets of that subdivision other than those enjoyed
by the general public.,26 One can hardly take issue with the rule
standing alone. However, when used in the context of the principal
case it begs the question. The landowner in the principal case be-
came a "user" of the street as a member of the general public and,
therefore, played his part in aiding consummation of the dedication.
Confusing the issue still further is the subtle intrusion of the law
of prescriptive easements into the domain of dedication. This handy
tool was employed in the principal case by simply stating that the
mere permissive use of a way over land does not imply a dedicatory
right in the public to unimpeded use." Doubtless the rule is validly
applied to create an easement of passage over land where there is
adverse user. However, user in prescription is not at all analogous
to user in dedication.28 Prescriptive user must contain an element
of hostility and an absence of acquiescence by the owner, at least for
twenty years.29 The easement is created by use which has the same
2 See, e.g., Palmer v. East River Gas Co., 115 App. Div. 677, 101 N.Y.
Supp. 347 (1906), where this point was made with unusual clarity by a
concurring judge who said, "Though a street used by the public generally
be not an official one, so that the city is under duty to keep it in repair, and
liable for damages for dangerous defects in it, it may nevertheless be a public
street in the sense that the public have and exercise the right of travel over
it, such right being conferred by the owner of the land in the street by dedi-
cation, such as granting the land abutting on it by conveyances bounding
on the street as shown by a map."
' Owens v. Elliot, 258 N.C. 314, 128 S.E.2d 538 (1962) ; Janicki v. Lorek,
255 N.C. 53, 120 S.E.2d 413 (1961); Hemphill v. Board of Aldermen, 212
N.C. 185, 193 S.E. 153 (1937).
"' The case cited to support this proposition, Chesson v. Jordan, 224 N.C.
289, 29 S.E.2d 906 (1944), concerned an easement and not dedication.
2 A most succinct discussion of the dissimilar elements of user in pre-
scription and user in dedication is found in Drimmell v. Kansas City, 180
Mo. App. 339, 168 S.W. 280 (1914). On this point the court said, inter alia,
"The throwing open of land to public use as a street without other formality
is sufficient to establish the fact of dedication to the public and if individuals
become interested to have it continue so, the owner cannot resume it. To
establish dedication by prescription in this state, user for ten years must be
shown; but a valid common-law dedication may be shown by an act of dedi-
cation and of the animus dedicandi without reference to the period of use."
Id. at 344, 168 S.W. at 281.
" Nicholas v. Salisbury Hardware & Furniture Co., 248 N.C. 462, 103
S.E.2d 837 (1958) ; Henry v. Farlow, 238 N.C. 542, 78 S.E.2d 244 (1953) ;
Whitacre v. City of Charlotte, 216 N.C. 687, 6 S.E.2d 558 (1940); Darr v.
Carolina Aluminum Co., 215 N.C. 768, 3 S.E.2d 434 (1939); Hemphill v.
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characteristics as adverse possession. A dedicator affirmatively
manifests an intent for the public to use his property. Adverse user
is simply not in play.3" The language in the principal case further
illustrates a commingling and confusion of the two doctrines by add-
ing the requirement of use for twenty years in a context involving
acceptance of an offer of dedication of subdivision streets.3 This is
wholly incorrect. It is generally accepted that, in a situation where
the owner has made an express offer of dedication, length of time
of use is not controlling and has nothing to do with the period of
adverse use necessary for a perfected prescriptive easement.32 It is
merely evidence of the intent of the public to accept the dedication.33
More important evidence of acceptance is the sufficiency of the char-
acter of the use, such as whether the land has been used for the pur-
pose for which it is dedicated, and whether the quantum of use is
Board of Aldermen, 212 N.C. 185, 193 S.E. 153 (1937); City of Durham v.
Wright, 190 N.C. 568, 130 S.E. 161 (1925); Draper v. Conners & Walters
Co., 187 N.C. 18, 121 S.E. 29 (1924). In some cases the two doctrines have
been correctly distinguished. After a finding of insufficient intent to dedicate,
the court has examined the facts to ascertain whether the conditions prece-
dent for prescriptive easement have been met. See, e.g., Nicholas v. Salis-
bury Hardware & Furniture Co., supra.
" Transue v. Croffoot, 179 Kan. 219, 294 P.2d 216 (1956); City of
Spokane v. Catholic Bishop of Spokane, 33 Wash. 2d 496, 206 P.2d 277
(1949). Where, in addition to acceptance, there is a question of intent to
dedicate, the two doctrines are more nearly parallel. In that instance some
courts have drawn an analogy to prescription and have often required a
satisfying of the same elements, including adverseness and use for a twenty
year period. Feuer v. Brenning, 201 Misc. 792, 115 N.Y.S.2d 384 (Sup. Ct.
1951), aff'd, 279 App. Div. 1033, 112 N.Y.S.2d 382 (1952), aff'd, 304 N.Y.
881, 110 N.E.2d 173 (1953).
" The court cited Scott v. Shackelford, 241 N.C. 738, 86 S.E.2d 453
(1955) ; Chesson v. Jordan, 224 N.C. 289, 29 S.E.2d 906 (1944) ; and Hemp-
hill v. Board of Aldermen, 212 N.C. 185, 193 S.E. 153 (1937). These cases
deal with prescriptive easements, not dedication.
" Tise v. Whitaker-Harvey Co., 146 N.C. 374, 59 S.E. 1012 (1907).
Acceptance may be shown by proof of public use for a lesser period of time
than that required for prescriptive easements or adverse possession. Fitz-
hugh v. Goforth, 228 Ark. 568, 309 S.W.2d 196 (1958); City of Venice v.
Short Line Beach Land Co., 180 Cal. 447, 181 Pac. 658 (1919) ; W.T. Congle-
ton & Co. v. Roberts, 221 Ky. 712, 299 S.W. 576 (1927); North Beach v.
North Chesapeake Beach Land & Improvement Co., 172 Md. 101, 191 AtI.
71 (1937).
"Gunn v. Fontes, 148 Cal. App.2d 351, 306 P.2d 928 (Dist. Ct. App.
1957); Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Sweatman, 81 Ga. App. 269, 58 S.E.2d
553 (1950); Chatham Motorcycle Club, Inc. v. Blount, 214 Ga. 770, 107
S.E.2d 806 (1959); Henry Walker Park Ass'n v. Mathews, 249 Iowa 1246,
91 N.W.2d 703 (1958); North Beach v. North Chesapeake Beach Land &
Improvement Co., supra note 32. Length of time of user is more important
and consequently may be required to continue for a longer period of time
when also relied on to create a presumption of dedication. City of Kansas
City v. Burke, 92 Kan. 531, 141 Pac. 562 (1914).
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consonant with the potential use in light of the surrounding cir-
cumstances. 34
In the final analysis the status of the doctrine of acceptance of
dedication by user in North Carolina is confused. The decided cases
have left a wake of conflicting statements and strangely amalgamated
concepts which do not entirely agree with the better reasoned authori-
ties. At least in the context of the principal case,35 a simple solution
would be to acknowledge that the general public, relying on the
manifested intent to dedicate streets in a subdivision, could make the
offer irrevocable by user without thereby imposing a duty of mainte-
nance on the public authorities.
JAMES M. TALLEY, JR.
Insurance-Contribution Rights under G.S. § 1-240
Of extreme practical importance to the practicing bar is the con-
tribution statute, G.S. § 1-240,1 around which a maze of question-
able procedural rules has been judicially constructed.' Considerable
"E.g., Dormont Borough Appeal, 371 Pa. 84, 89 A.2d 351 (1952) (use
only by residents of immediate neighborhood, insufficient acceptance by gen-
eral public).
" The finding of an incomplete dedication in the principal case may well
have been supportable on the facts, even if the court had recognized user as
a mode of acceptance. Even so, it would seem that a discussion of user and
the weighing of the factors that combine to determine whether there has
been sufficient user was necessary to correctly reach the final result.
IN.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-240 (1953) provides in effect that "(1) those who
are jointly and severally liable as judgment debtors, either as joint obligors
or as joint tort-feasors, may pay the judgment and have it transferred to a
trustee for their benefit, and such transfer shall have the effect of preserving
the lien of the judgment against the judgment debtor who does not pay his
proportionate part thereof to the extent of his liability; (2) joint tort-feasors
against whom judgment has been obtained may, in a subsequent action there-
for, enforce contribution from other joint tort-feasors who were not made
parties to the action in which the judgment was taken; (3) joint tort-feasors
who are made parties defendant, at any time before judgment is obtained,
may, upon motion, have the other joint tort-feasors made parties defendant;
(4) joint judgment debtors who do not agree as to their proportionate lia-
bility, by petition in the cause, in which it is alleged that any other jointjudgment debtor is insolvent or a nonresident and cannot be forced under
execution to contribute to the payment of the judgment, may have their
proportionate liability ascertained by court and jury; and (5) joint judgment
debtors who tender payment of judgment and demand in writing transfer
thereof to a trustee for their benefit, and are refused such transfer by judg-
ment creditors, may not thereafter have execution issued against them upon
said judgments." Gaffney v. Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co., 209 N.C. 515, 518,
184 S.E. 46, 47 (1936).
' See 40 N.C.L. Rlv. 633 (1962).
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uncertainty also exists as to the act's current substantive effect, and
legislative revision would seem to be in order.
One important question to be considered if the statute is revised
will be whether to codify or eradicate the present rule recently re-
affirmed in Herring v. Jackson3 that a liability insurance carrier may
not be subrogated to its insured's right to contribution against a joint
tortfeasor. This dubious doctrine, peculiar to this state, was an-
nounced by our court over twenty-five years ago in Gaffney v.
Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co.,4 where the original defendant insurer
attempted to implead the joint tortfeasor and his liability carrier.
It was said there that since the right to contribution was purely
statutory in derogation of the common-law rule that joint tortfeasors
had no such remedy, "a most liberal construction of the statute will
not permit the writing into it of the liability insurance carrier of
tort-feasors when only tort-feasors and judgment debtors are men-
tioned therein."5 It may well be questioned whether a truly "liberal"
court in that instance would not have written the word "insurers'
into the statute, relying upon the equitable theory of subrogation. .
Other courts have not found themselves incapable of performing this
very task 7 and liability insurance carriers are generally held to be
entitled to such rights without question where they exist in favor
of their insureds.s
'255 N.C. 537, 122 S.E.2d 366 (1961), discussed in Civil Procedure
(Pleading and Parties), Ninth Annual Survey of North Carolina Case Law,
40 N.C.L. REv. 494 (1962).
209 N.C. 515, 184 S.E. 46 (1936), discussed in 15 N.C.L. REv. 289'(1937). A default judgment had been entered and returned unsatisfied
against defendant's insured prior to the action.
rId. at 519, 184 S.E. at 47-48.
' See note 14 infra and accompanying text.
'Silver Fleet Motor Express, Inc. v. Zody, 43 F. Supp. 459 (E.D. Ky.
1942); State ex rel. McCubbin v. McMillian, 349 S.W.2d 453 (Mo. Ct. App.
1961); McKay v. Citizens Rapid Transit Co., 190 Va. 851, 59 S.E.2d 121
(1950).
'E.g., Preferred Acc. Ins. Co. of New York v. Musante, Berman & Stein-
berg Co., 133 Conn. 536, 52 A.2d 862 (1947) ; Hawkeye-Security Ins. Co. v.
Lowe Constr. Co., 251 Iowa 27, 99 N.W.2d 421 (1959) ; Leitner v. Hawkins,
311 Ky. 300, 223 S.W.2d 988 (1949) (rule discussed although insured sought
contribution without objection after settlement); Underwriters at Lloyds of
Minneapolis v. Smith, 166 Minn. 388, 208 N.W. 13 (1926) ; Western Cas. &
Sur. Co. v. Milwaukee Gen. Constr. Co., 213 Wis. 302, 251 N.W. 491 (1933).
See also Annot., 60 A.L.R.2d 1366, at 1388 (1958 & Supp. 1962); Annot., 171
A.L.R. 271 (1947) supplementing Annot., 75 A.L.R. 1486 (1931).
The UNIFORM CONTRIBuTIO N AMONG TORTFEASORs AcT § 1(e) (1955)
provides: "A liability insurer, who by payment has discharged in full or in
part the liability of a tortfeasor and has thereby discharged in full its obliga-
tion as insurer, is subrogated to the tortfeasor's'right of contribution to the
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Apparently defendant insurer in Gaffney did not believe the court
meant what it said, for after satisfying the judgment and causing
it to be assigned to a trustee, the insurance carrier recovered a de-
fault judgment against the joint tortfeasor 9 and then proceeded to
sue his insurer for contribution. The theory advanced was that if
G.S. § 1-240 did not confer the right, the equitable principle of sub-
rogation did without regard to the provisions of the statute. A
demurrer was sustained and affirmed.10
These decisions did not attain their real importance, however,
until the enactment of the Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility
Acts of 1953 and 1957, providing for compulsory liability coverage.1
The question then arose as to how far these cases extended. The
answer came three years ago in Squires v. Sorahan.12 Judgment had
been entered against four defendants, an agent and his three prin-
cipals, one of which had left the state and could not be forced under
execution -to contribute to payment. Liability insurers of two de-
fendants satisfied the judgment, one paying five-sixths and the other
the remainder. After having the judgment assigned to a trustee for
the benefit of its insured, the former company in the name of its
insured proceeded by petition in the cause for a judgment establish-
ing the proportionate part each judgment debtor should pay. The
petition was denied. On appeal, counsel for appellant argued that
the earlier decisions were distinguishable in that they merely held
that a liability insurer and its insured, upon paying more than a pro-
portionate share of the judgment, could not go directly against the
insurer of the other joint judgment debtor, and did not rule out an
.action against the latter.' 3 The supreme court disagreed.
-extent of the amount it has paid in excess of the tortfeasor's pro rata share
of the common liability. This provision does not limit or impair any right
.of subrogation arising from any other relationship." HANDBOOK OF T31E
.NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS 218
,(1.955).
See note 14 infra.
1
,Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co. v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 211 N.C.
13, 188 S.E. 634 (1936), 15 N.C.L. REv. 289 (1937): "There is no rela-
tionship between joint tort-feasors which entitles one joint tort-feasor to
contribution from the other joint tort-feasor. Neither is liable as surety for
the other. Each is liable for the damages caused by their joint and concurring
negligence. But for the statute, neither is entitled to contribution from the
other." Id. at 17, 188 S.E. at 636.
'
1 N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 20-279.1 to -279.39, 20-309 to -319 (Supp. 1961).
12252 N.C. 589, 114 S.E.2d 277 (1960), 12 MERCER L. REV. 276.
x' Brief for Appellant, p. 17. Counsel for appellant pointed out that the
court had recognized without comment in Lumbermen's Mut.'Cas. Co. v.
United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 211 N.C. 13, 188 S.E. 634 (1936), that plain-
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Although producing no substantial change in the North Carolina
law, the Herring decision, because of the particular facts involved,
presented the court with a reasonable opportunity to re-evaluate the
Gaffney rule. In Herring the insured instituted an independent suit
for contribution against the joint tortfeasor after plaintiff's insur-
ance carrier had paid the injured party pursuant to a consent
judgment in return for the insured's execution of a "loan receipt.' 14
Reasoning that the "loan receipt" was merely a subterfuge employed
by the insurer in an effort to circumvent and subvert G.S. §§ 1-57
tiff's action for contribution was grounded on a prior default judgment en-
tered against defendant's insured, establishing his liability as a joint tort-
feasor. The argument was also made that the theory of subrogation was
improperly presented in that case because instead of contending that the
insurer was equitably subrogated to the statutory right of contribution, plain-
tiff there argued that subrogation provided the right without regard to the
statute. Brief for Appellant, pp. 15-16. The court answered that the statute
could not "be stretched to include subrogation, which arises by reason of
contract, into contribution, which arises by reason of participation in the
tort." Squires v. Sorahan, 252 N.C. 589, 591, 114 S.E. 2d 277, 279 (1960).
The tenor of the opinion was that the insured was not the real party in in-
terest, but this was not explicitly stated by the court.
" This agreement was in the standard form, stating that the plaintiff
received the sum required to pay the judgment against him from the insur-
ance company as a loan to be repayable only in the event and only to the
extent of any recovery which might be had by the plaintiff from the de-
fendant as a joint tortfeasor. It further provided that the plaintiff agreed
to cooperate fully with the insurer and would allow the suit to be brought
in his name, if necessary, to the end that all right of contribution which he
had or might thereafter acquire could be enforced. Finally, it was provided
that the expense of the litigation, if any, would be borne by 'the insurance
carrier and if an action was brought, it would be under the exclusive control
of the insurance company.
Counsel for plaintiff-appellant, representing insurer and insured, informed
this writer that the decision to bring the loan receipt arrangement before the
court by way of an independent action for contribution in lieu of impleading
the joint tortfeasor as a third party defendant in the claimant's suit was
reached on the basis of the following facts: Claimant and joint tortfeasor
were related and instituted separate suits against the insured in different
counties. It was thought that claimant could prove liability and recover at
least $15,000, but that insured was not liable for the injury specified in the
joint tortfeasor's suit. Also, insured had a substantial claim against the
latter. Hence, settlement was made with claimant for $8,750, the policy
limit being $10,000, and a counterclaim was filed along with the answer to
the joint tortfeasor's subsequent action. The joint tortfeasor failed to estab-
lish negligence as the proximate cause of the injury for which he had sued,
the jury apparently choosing to believe that this injury had been received in
a previous accident, but the insured established the joint tortfeasor's negli-
gence and recovered over $4,000 on his counterclaim as to which the joint
tortfeasor had failed to plead contributory negligence. The stage was then
set to test the "loan receipt" in an independent action for contribution since
the issue of defendant's negligence was res judicata under the rule of Stansel
v. McIntyre, 237 N.C. 148, 74 S.E.2d 345 (1953).
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and 1-240, the court held that the settlement represented not a loan
but payment under the policy. Thus, the insurer-not its insured-
was the real party in interest under G.S. § 1-57,'5 and since insurance
carriers have no right of contribution under G.S. § 1-240 as con-
strued, the judgment of dismissal was affirmed."0
No valid quarrel can be made with the unerring logic of the
decision. Many cases have approved the "loan receipt" device as a
means of avoiding subrogation of the insurer and leaving the in-
sured as the real party in interest, but with few exceptions, all
involved claims for damage to the insured's property by fire, collision
or similar casualty allegedly caused by the tortious act of a third
party.'7  In such situations, the only purpose of a "loan" is to shield
insurance companies from the possible prejudice of jurors, since by
full payment insurers are universally subrogated to their insureds'
rights and may sue in their own names.'" In fact, the North Caro-
lina Supreme Court has said in dictum no less than three times,
including the instant decision, that a "loan receipt" will be respected
in such a situation.'9
In contrast, the only case20 found allowing an insured to prosecute
a contribution suit for the benefit of his liability insurance carrier
through the use of a "loan receipt" was decided in a jurisdiction
where the insurer, had it chosen, could have sued in its own right.2'
Since in that decision the sole purpose of the "loan" was to avoid
15 For the North Carolina rules regarding insurance carriers under G.S.
§1-57, see Southeastern Fire Ins. Co. v. Moore, 250 N.C. 351, 108 S.E.2d 618(1959) and cases cited therein, discussed in Note, 38 N.C.L. Rnv. 99 (1959).
" Counsel for appellant presented the Herring case by way of hypotheti-
cal in his brief in Squires and predicted this result.
1
'E.g., Luckenbach v. W. J. McCahan Sugar Ref. Co., 248 U.S. 139(1918); Capo v. C-0 Two Fire Equip. Co., 93 F. Supp. 4 (D.N.J. 1950);
Gould v. Weibel, 62 So. 2d 47 (Fla. Sup. Ct. 1952); Green v. Johns, 86 Ga.
App. 646, 72 S.E.2d 78 (1952) ; Klukas v. Yount, 98 N.E.2d 227 (Ind. App. Ct.
1951); Sosnow, Kranz & Simkoe, Inc. v. Storatti Corp., 269 App. Div. 122,
54 N.Y.S.2d 780 (1945) aff'd iner., 295 N.Y. 675, 65 N.E.2d 326 (1946).
See generally Annot., 157 A.L.R. 1261 (1945), supplementing Annots., 132
A.L.R. 607 (1942) and 1 A.L.R. 1528 (1919).
18 Burgess v. Trevathan, 236 N.C. 157, 72 S.E.2d 231 (1952); Service
Fire Ins. Co. v. Horton Motor Lines, Inc., 225 N.C. 588, 35 S.E.2d 879
(1945).
" Herring v. Jackson, 255 N.C. 537, 545-46, 122 S.E.2d 366, 373 (1961);
Southeastern Fire Ins. Co. v. Moore, 250 N.C. 351, 354, 108 S.E.2d 618, 620(1959); Cunningham v. Railroad, 139 N.C. 427, 433-34, 51 S.E. 1029, 1031(1905).




jury prejudice, the holding was distinguished, our court reasoning
that since the insurer there could have prosecuted the action itself
had it so desired, the defendant was not adversely affected. In short,
Herring v. Jackson stands for the proposition that a liability in-
surance carrier cannot create a cause of action in itself through the
use of a "mere fiction." Overall, it is reluctantly conceded that it
was asking too much of the court to overturn the established rule
on the basis of such a fictitious transaction. Plaintiff-appellant might
have argued that the insured was the trustee of an express trust
22
under G.S. § 1-63 or that payment by the insurer was in practical
effect payment by the insured through the premiums, 2 ' but no author-
ity directly in point could have been cited for either proposition. It
appears safe to say that the court has spoken the final word on this
question,24 and that any relief from the harshness of the present rule
can only come through the legislative process.
As the law apparently now stands, an insurer must bear the entire
burden if it satisfies a judgment before judgment is entered in favor
of its insured for contribution against the joint tortfeasor; that is,
the liability carrier can preserve its insured's right to contribution
2 Dixey v. Federal Compress & Warehouse Co., 132 F.2d 275 (8th Cir.
1942); Miller v. Pine Bluff Hotel Co., 170 F. Supp. 552 (E.D. Ark. 1959);
Gould v. Weibel, 62 So. 2d 47 (Fla. Sup. Ct. 1952); Sosnow, Kranz & Sim-
koe, Inc. v. Storatti Corp., 269 App. Div. 122, 54 N.Y.S.2d 780 (1945) aff'd
inem., 295 N.Y. 675, 65 N.E.2d 326 (1946).
The contention that the insured is the trustee of an express trust, or an
action brought in the name of the trustee after assignment of claimant'sjudgment to him would very likely be unsuccessful. The North Carolina
court recently in Ingram v. Nationwide Mut. Cas. Co., 258 N.C. 632, 637,
129 S.E.2d 222, 227 (1963), held in effect that the assignee of a judgment,
or the trustee of a judgment debtor, could maintain an independent action
for indemnity against a co-defendant "subject to the rule that the payment
in full by a judgment debtor operates as an absolute discharge of the judg-
ment, notwithstanding that an assignment is made to a trustee to keep it alive,
if the payor is not, aside from the assignment, entitled to contribution, sub-
rogation or indemnity." The court would probably hold that the insurer,
not the insured, was the "payor" under this exception to the rule that the
trustee may sue. Also, plaintiff insured in Herring was really no more than
an agent for collection who cannot qualify as trustee of an express trust.
Martin v. Mask, 158 N.C. 436, 74 S.E. 343 (1912). Finally, the court has
indicated that the same defenses must be available to defendant against either
such a trustee or his cestui que trust. Mebane v. Mebane, 66 N.C. 334 (1872).
" Fiorentino v. Adkins, 154 Atl. 429 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1931); Adams v.
Book, 244 App. Div. 646, 280 N.Y. Supp. 88 (1935).
2 "Manifestly, plaintiff cannot, by the 'device' or 'mere fiction' of a 'Loan
Receipt' agreement or otherwise, confer upon Nationwide a right to contri-
bution when such right is denied by the decisions of this Court." Herring
v. Jackson, 255 N.C. 537, 545, 122 S.E.2d 366, 373 (1961). (Emphasis
added.)
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only by impleading the joint tortfeasor as an additional defendant.
By this procedure, plaintiff's judgment against the insured and the
latter's judgment against the additional defendant for contribution
are entered at the same time, thus preserving the right." The teach-
ing 6f the Gaffney case is that this cross-action must be prosecuted
in the name of the insured. Independent actions and motions in the
cause for contribution after entry and satisfaction of plaintiff's judg-
ment, whether brought by insurer or insured, afford no relief as
shown by the decisions in Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co., Herring, and
Squires. It is difficult, if not impossible, to find any rational basis for
allowing contribution in the one instance and not in the other. Also,
under the decisions interpreting G.S. § 1-57, if plaintiff's judgment
exceeds the policy limits by the slightest amount, the cause of action
remains in the insured, thus enabling him to bring a subsequent suit
for contribution against the joint tortfeasor" or his insurer, if the
former's liability has been established in a prior action.1
7
Furthermore, the sole procedural remedy of cross-action is not
always available. For example, if the joint tortfeasor is a large
corporation, wealthy individual, or other so-called "target defend-
ant," counsel for original defendant may decide that forfeiture of
the contribution right is wiser than risking an increased recovery
due to the additional defendant's presence in the suit. Also, when
plaintiff joins all defendants in his complaint, cross-claims for con-
" Counsel for plaintiff in the Herring case states that there is a strong
belief among many members of the insurance bar that this avenue is also
closed by Herring. At least one insurer of an additional defendant has been
advised not to recognize the judgment for contribution rendered against its
insured, and litigation is expected to follow. The theory is that the original
defendant cannot enforce the judgment for contribution until the plaintiff's
judgment has been paid, and when this payment has been made by an insurer,
the cause of action for contribution no longer resides in the insured but is
extinguished. No case has yet decided this issue. See also Smith v. Whisen-
hunt, 259 N.C. 234, 130 S.E.2d 334 (1963), where the jury was unable to
reach a decision on the contribution issue, and the court ordered a new trial
on that issue alone.
2 See Southeastern Fire Ins. Co. v. Moore, 250 N.C. 351, 108 S.E.2d
618 (1959), and cases cited therein, discussed in 38 N.C.L. REv. 99 (1959).
Suppose the insurer is liable on its policy up to $10,000 and judgment is
entered for $12,000. It would be consistent with the cases discussed in this
note if the insured could only recover $1,000 in contribution from the joint
tortfeasor, but in accord with current real party in interest rules, the insured
may collect $2,000 for himself and $4,000 as trustee for his liability insurance
carrier.
27 Ingram v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 258 N.C. 632, 129 S.E.2d 222
(1963). Most policies provide that the insurer shall be liable only for those
sums insured is "legally obligated" to pay.
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tribution are not allowed.2" This necessarily means that G.S. § 1-240
is completely ineffective as to joint judgment debtors and obligors,
at least in the instance when they are active joint tortfeasors2 when
the judgment is satisfied by the liability insurer or insurers paying
the entire sum or more than their proportionate share or shares.
When G.S. § 1-240 was first enacted in 1929, it amounted to an
announcement of legislative policy favoring contribution.3 ° Con-
sidering the fact that nearly all North Carolina motorists now carry
liability insurance, it is evident that the statute retains little of its
former effectiveness. It is often said that if the rule were otherwise
the particular insurer would profit little, since gains from realizing
and losses from paying contribution would probably cancel one
another in a multitude of cases. It would seem, however, that the
validity of this argument depends on whether the different insurance
firms write approximately the same number of policies. Also over-
looked is the fact that the absence of the right is reflected in higher
insurance rates, and it is highly unlikely that the insurer will ever
recoup any amount paid in contribution to resident self-insurers and
nonresident motorists who are uninsured. Simply stated, the cur-
rent rule does not treat the particular parties in the specific suit in
an equitable manner.
It is also safe to assume that insurers are hesitant to settle and
lose their contribution possibilities where there is an honest question
of joint tortfeasorship and where a compromise settlement cannot
be reached with the other carrier. Thus, the no contribution as to
insurers rule runs afoul of the general policy of the law favoring
settlement"1 and frustrates the purpose of the Financial Responsibility
2 Greene v. Charlotte Chem. Labs, Inc., 254 N.C. 680, 120 S.E.2d 82
(1961), criticized in 40 N.C.L. Rv. 633 (1962). Claimants might possibly
utilize this rule as a threat to force settlement.
"A defendant secondarily liable may cross-claim for indemnity against
his co-defendant, who is primarily responsible. Greene v. Charlotte Chem.
Labs, Inc., supra note 28.
" As to the policy of contribution, see the opposing positions of Professors
James and Gregory, Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors: A Pragmatic
Criticism; A Defense, 54 HARV. L. Rzv. 1156 (1941).
" It is true that G.S. § 1-240 requires a judgment to support the right to
contribution so that in every instance at least a consent judgment must be
entered. Should the statute be revised, the legislature should seriously con-
sider whether this burdensome condition should be retained. A prior judg-
ment is unnecessary because the identical questions will be in issue and the
same defenses available to the joint tortfeasor in the contribution action.
Western Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Milwaukee Gen. Constr. Co., 213 Wis. 302, 251
N.W. 491 (1933).
Section 1 of the UNIFORM CONTRIBUTION AMONG TORTnSORs AcT, set
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Acts, which were enacted for the benefit of the highway victim. The
General Assembly might well consider changing this rule based
purely upon legal reasoning without sufficient regard to practical
considerations.
JOHN BRYAN WHITLEY
Oral Contracts to Devise Realty-Right of Third Party Beneficiary
to Recover on Quantum Meruit
In North Carolina an oral contract to devise real property is
void under the Statute of Frauds,' and part performance by the
promisee will not remove the contract from the operation of the
Statute.2 However, the promisee who performs services pursuant to
such a contract has a remedy on implied assumpsit or quantum meruit
to recover the value of the services rendered.'
Pickelsimer v. Pickelsimer4 presented the question of whether
the third party beneficiary of a contract that is void under the Statute
of Frauds may recover on quantum meruit the value of services ren-
dered by the promisee pursuant to the contract. In this case the
father of an illegitimate child had orally promised the child's mother
that he would devise and bequeath to the child a one-fifth part of his
estate if she would refrain from instituting bastardy proceedings
out in the HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS
ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS 218 (1955), provides: "(a) Except as otherwise
provided in this Act, where two or more persons become jointly or severally
liable in tort for the same injury to person or property or for the same
wrongful death, there is a right of contribution among them even though
judgment has not been recovered against all or any of then .... (d) A
tortfeasor who enters into a settlement with a claimant is not entitled to
recover contribution from another tortfeasor whose liability for the injury
or wrongful death is not extinguished by the settlement nor in respect to any
amount paid in a settlement which is in excess of what was reasonable."
(Emphasis added.)
IN.C. GEN. STAT. § 22-2 (1953).
2 Duckett v. Harrison, 235 N.C. 145, 69 S.E.2d 176 (1952); Ebert v.
Disher, 216 N.C. 36, 3 S.E.2d 301 (1939); Grantham v. Grantham, 205 N.C.
363, 171 S.E. 331 (1933); Albea v. Griffin, 22 N.C. 9 (1838). Part per-
formance by the promisee will remove the oral contract from the operation
of the Statute in all but three states. E.g., Betterly v. Granger, 350 Mich.
651, 87 N.W.2d 330 (1957); Holt v. Alexander, 207 Okla. 140, 248 P.2d 228
(1952); Patton v. Patton, 201 Va. 705, 112 S.E.2d 849 (1960). See gen-
erally RESTATEMENT, CoNTRACTs § 197 (1932); 1 PAGE, WILLs § 10.13 (Bowe-
Parker rev. 1960).
Gales v. Smith, 249 N.C. 263, 106 S.E.2d 164 (1958); Daughtry v.
Daughtry, 223 N.C. 528, 27 S.E.2d 446 (1943); Grantham v. Grantham,
supra note 2.
'257 N.C. 696, 127 S.E.2d 557 (1962).
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against him and perform certain domestic services. The father died
having breached his promise.' The child sued her father's estate for
damages for breach of the oral contract to devise or, alternatively,
on quantum neruit for the reasonable value of services performed
by the mother pursuant to the contract. The North Carolina Su-
preme Court held that the plaintiff's action for breach of the oral
contract to devise was barred by the Statute of Frauds,6 and that no
recovery could be had on quantum reruit because "it was her
mother who performed the services-not the plaintiff."'7
The court recognized the right of a third party to enforce a con-
tract made for his benefit.' However, the court pointed 6ut that
since this right is necessarily dependent upon the existence of a valid
contract,9 it could not arise from an oral contract that is void under
the Statute of Frauds. In determining that the plaintiff was not en-
titled to recover on quantum meruit, the court stated:
While the law will not permit one person to take the labor
of another without compensation when it was performed and
received in expectation of payment, it does not follow as a
corollary that a third-party beneficiary under a void contract
can recover for labor which another performed, even though
such labor provided the consideration for the void contract.1"
It is believed that the principal case marks the first direct deter-
mination of a third party beneficiary's rights on quantum meruit
in any jurisdiction. 1 Notwithstanding the novelty of the question
'The complaint alleged the value of a one-fifth part of the father's estate
to be approximately $250,000.00. By her father's will, the child was be-
queathed the sum of $1,000.00, plus $75.00 a month until she reached the age
of eighteen.
' "An indivisible oral contract to devise both real and personal property
is also void." 257 N.C. at 698, 127 S.E.2d at 559. Accord, McCraw v.
Llewellyn, 256 N.C. 213, 123 S.E.2d 575 (1962); Humphrey v. Faison, 247
N.C. 127, 100 S.E.2d 524 (1957).257 N.C. at 703, 127 S.E.2d at 563.8Accord, Brown v. Bowers Constr. Co., 236 N.C. 462, 73 S.E.2d 147
(1952) ; Canestrino v. Powell, 231 N.C. 190, 56 S.E.2d 566 (1949).
' See Lammonds v. Aleo Mfg. Co., 243 N.C. 749, 92 S.E.2d 143 (1956).
See generally RESTATRMENT, CONTRACTS § 140 (1932); 4 CORBIN, CONTRACTS
§ 818 (1951); 2 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 364A (3d ed. 1959).
10257 N.C. at 704, 127 S.E.2d at 563.
' The research for this note has disclosed no cases in which the third
party beneficiary of a void contract was denied the right to recover the value
of services rendered by the promisee pursuant to the contract. However, in
Graham v. Graham, 134 App. Div. 777, 119 N.Y. Supp. 1013 (1909), the
defendant had orally agreed with the plaintiff to convey land to a third per-
son in consideration of services to be performed by the plaintiff. The
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presented, the court was compelled to deal extensively with cases
supporting the plaintiff's position.
One such case was Redmon v. Roberts.'2  In Redmon, the father
of an illegitimate child had orally promised the child's mother that,
if she would refrain from instituting bastardy proceedings against
him, he would devise the child a share of his estate equal to that of
his other children. When the father died intestate, the child sued
his estate for breach of the oral contract to devise. In answer to the
defendant's contention that recovery was barred by the Statute of
Frauds, the court, citing prior North Carolina cases, 13 stated, "this
Court and Courts generally have upheld and enforced oral contracts
to devise or convey land in consideration of services rendered."' 4
The plaintiff, a third party beneficiary, was permitted to recover.
In Pickelsimer the court, in overruling Redmon, pointed out that
the general proposition announced there was not sustained by the
North Carolina cases' 5 cited in support thereof. Indeed, in none of
the cases cited in Redmon did the court uphold and enforce the oral
contract to devise or convey. Rather, the defendant was compelled
to pay the reasonable value of what he had received on the theory
that it would be inequitable to allow the defendant to repudiate the
oral contract and at the same time retain benefits derived thereunder
at the expense of the plaintiff.
Two Kentucky cases 6 were also cited in support of the general
proposition announced in Redmon. In each case, the father of an
plaintiff fully performed and, upon repudiation of the contract by the de-
fendant, brought an action to recover the reasonable value of his services.
Apparently speaking to the defense that the action lay in the third party,
the New York court stated: "In the case at bar the premises were not to be
conveyed to the promisee, but to a third party. But, the agreement was
unenforceable because not written. There was no contract, therefore, upon
which the beneficiary could sue. To the promisee alone is raised the implied
contract to repay the value of the services rendered in performance of the
voidable parol contract, which the promisor afterwards refused to perform."
Id. at 779, 119 N.Y. Supp. at 1014.
12 198 N.C. 161, 150 S.E. 881 (1929).
Brown v. Williams, 196 N.C. 247, 145 S.E. 233 (1928) ; Deal v. Wil-
son, 178 N.C. 600, 101 S.E. 205 (1919); McCurry v. Purgason, 170 N.C. 463,
87 S.E. 244 (1915); Faircloth v. Kenlaw, 165 N.C. 228, 81 S.E. 299 (1914);
Lipe v. Houck, 128 N.C. 115, 38 S.E. 297 (1901); Whetstine v. Wilson, 104
N.C. 384, 10 S.E. 471 (1889).
1, 198 N.C. at 164, 150 S.E. at 883.
15 See cases cited note 13 supra.
1" Bowling v. Bowling's Adm'r, 222 Ky. 396, 300 S.W. 876 (1927) ; Doty's
Adm'r v. Doty's Guardian, 118 Ky. 204, 80 S.W. 803 (1904). These two
cases were based on the prior case of Benge v. Hiatts Adm'r, 82 Ky. 666(1885).
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illegitimate child had orally promised the child's mother, in consid-
eration of her surrender of custody or her forbearance to institute
bastardy proceedings against him, that he would give land to the
child or make him an equal heir with his other children. The father,
having received the promised consideration, breached his promise.
The child brought suit in each case to enforce the father's oral
promise. The Kentucky Court of Appeals held the promises un-
enforceable under the Statute of Frauds, but allowed the plaintiff to
recover the value of the property orally promised because the mother's
performance could not be accurately valued in monetary terms.'7
These cases were particularly favorable to the plaintiff's position
in Pickelsimer, since Kentucky, at the time the cases were decided,
was one of the small minority of states, including North Carolina,
which did not recognize the doctrine of part performance.' 8  Never-
theless, the court refused to follow the Kentucky cases, pointing out
that in neither opinion had the Kentucky court mentioned the fact
that the plaintiff, a third party beneficiary of an unenforceable con-
"
7 Kentucky, in a long line of decisions, had fashioned a unique measure of
damages for the situation in which the services rendered were not adaptable
to accurate monetary evaluation. In such a situation, the measure of dam-
ages was deemed as a matter of law to be the value of the promised realty.
Walker v. Dill's Adm'r 186 Ky. 638, 218 S.W. 247 (1920); Waters v. Cline,
121 Ky. 611, 85 S.W. 209 (1905). Kentucky, in the recent case of Miller
v. Miller, 335 S.W.2d 884 (Ky. 1960), has apparently abandoned the rule.
See note 18 infra. In Redmon v. Roberts, 198 N.C. 161, 150 S.E. 881(1929), the North Carolina court uttered a dictum approving the trial
court's application of this standard. It may have been followed in Hager v.
Whitener, 204 N.C. 747, 169 S.E. 645 (1933), although it-is difficult to de-
termine whether the recovery in that case was limited to the value of the
plaintiff's services. It was dealt with and disapproved in Grantham v. Gran-
tham, 205 N.C. 363, 171 S.E. 331 (1933), though it has been suggested that
the facts of that case would not warrant interpreting the court's treatment
to be an express repudiation. See Note, 39 N.C.L. REv. 98 (1960). If the
Grantham case did not operate as an express repudiation of the rule, it is
believed that there is language in the principal case sufficient to prevent its
adoption in North Carolina in the near future.
18 Doty's Adm'r v. Doty's Guardian, 118 Ky. 204, 80 S.W. 803 (1904). In
Miller v. Miller, supra note 17, the Kentucky court may have adopted the
doctrine of part performance. The plaintiff, a third party beneficiary of a
contract within the statute of frauds, was permitted to recover the promised
realty. Theretofore, when the value of services rendered pursuant to the
oral contract was impossible of monetary evaluation, the person suing had
been permitted to recover the value of the promised realty as a matter of
law. See note 17 supra. Whether Miller should be interpreted as placing
Kentucky among those states which recognize the doctrine of part perform-
ance is questionable, since nowhere in the opinion is the doctrine mentioned,
and it is not certain that the same result would be reached in cases where the
services are possible of monetary evaluation. For further reflection on the
Kentucky position, see 50 Ky. L.J. 220 (1961).
1963]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
tract, was recovering on quantum reruit. Indeed, in one of the
cases, the Kentucky court implied that the plaintiff was recovering
for breach of the oral contract, although in the same case it held the
oral contract unenforceable under the Statute of Frauds.'0
With Redmon and the Kentucky cases disposed of, the court then
had to decide whether or not the law will imply a promise on the
part of one who receives services from another to pay their reason-
able value to a third person. This question was partially resolved
by reference to the measure of damages in a quantum meruit action.
The court stated that recovery on quantum meruit "is always on the
basis of the reasonable value of the services rendered by the one and
accepted by the other, less any benefits received by the one." 20  It was
reasoned that since the plaintiff had not rendered the services, the
law would not imply a promise to pay her their reasonable value. In-
stead, if any action on quantum meruit arose from the facts of the
principal case, it belonged to the mother who had rendered the
services.
The principal case reflects a desire to eliminate the confusion en-
gendered by the loose language employed and the result achieved in
the Redmon case. An analysis of that case would indicate that a quan-
tum meruit recovery is predicated on the oral contract to devise,
subject only to a limitation on the amount of damages recoverable.
Such a position would be wholly inimical to the Statute of Frauds,
since the policy of that Statute dictates that no agreement to devise
realty, whether express or implied in fact, can be enforced unless
1 In Doty's Adm'r v. Doty's Guardian, supra note 18, the defendant con-
tended that no recovery could be had on the contract since it contemplated
future illicit relations between the mother and the father. The Kentucky
court, in answering this contention, stated: "If this were a suit by the mother
for her services we have no question the principle should be applied, but it
is not a suit for her services. It is a suit by the child." Id. at 219, 80 S.W.
at 807. (Emphasis added.) The court held the oral contract unenforceable,
pointing out that part performance would not cure the result, and then
stated: "The contract is not otherwise within the statute of frauds, and while
appellee can not be adjudged the land, the value of the thing promised may
be estimated, and compensation for the breach of the contract may be ad-
judged ... ." Id. at 220, 80 S.W. at 808. (Emphasis added.) The language
employed and the result achieved in this and other Kentucky cases lead this
writer to wonder whether Kentucky is not actually allowing an action for
breach of the oral contract to devise subject to a special measure of damages
to vindicate the policy behind the statute of frauds.
20 257 N.C. at 704, 127 S.E.2d at 563. Accord, Doub v. Hauser, 256 N.C.




reduced to writing. Thus, in recent cases,21 the court has been
careful to point out that a quantum meruit recovery is not based on
the oral agreement between the parties, but rather on a contract which
the law implies to prevent unjust enrichment. If this theoretical
distinction is actually sustained in practice, then the principal case
would appear to be beyond question.
The court in Pickelsimer was faced essentially with the question
of whether or not there may be a third party beneficiary of a con-
tract implied in law. Ordinarily, the right of a third party to main-
tain an action on a contract is dependent on the manifest intention
of the parties to the contract to benefit the third party thereby.22 On
the other hand, a contract implied in law arises wholly without regard
to the intentions of the parties. Instead, it arises from the equities of
a particular situation. It is not a contract at all in the true sense,
but rather a legal fiction created by the court as a means for vindi-
cating the policy against unjust enrichment.23 If the intention of
the parties does not control the creation of the contract implied in
law, then the requisite intent for the creation of third party rights
would also be lacking. Nothing else appearing, when one has re-
ceived services from another under circumstances which permit the
inference that the recipient intended to pay and the other party
expected compensation for the services, the law will not imply a
promise to pay their reasonable value to a stranger.
Yet, it is not altogether clear from the cases that the only con-
tract being enforced in the quantum meruit situation is the contract
implied in law. In the absence of some agreement between the
parties, it would be difficult to prove facts giving rise to a contract
implied in law. Accordingly, evidence of the oral contract is admis-
sible to show facts and circumstances permitting the inference that
payment for the services was intended on the one hand and expected
on the other.24 Such evidence may also be used to rebut any pre-
sumption that the services were rendered gratuitiously.25 Though
evidence of the oral contract for these two purposes would be suffi-
"
1E.g., Stewart v. Wyrick, 228 N.C. 429, 45 S.E.2d 764 (1947).
"' See Traders Land Co. v. Abbott Realty Co., 207 N.C. 453, 177 S.E. 335
(1934).23Hunsucker v. High Point Bending & Chair Co., 237 N.C. 559, 75
S.E.2d 768 (1953); Queen v. DeHart, 209 N.C. 414, 184. S.E. 7 (1936);
Montgomery v. Lewis, 187 N.C. 577, 122 S.E. 374 (1924).
' Gales v. Smith, 249 N.C. 263, 106 S.E.2d 164 (1958); Nesbitt v.
Donoho, 198 N.C. 147, 150 S.E. 875 (1929).
"
5 Wells v. Foreman, 236 N.C. 351, 72 S.E.2d 765 (1952).
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cient to establish facts giving rise to the contract implied in law, the
use of such evidence is not limited to these purposes. Indeed, the
contract price is admissible as evidence, though not conclusive, of
the reasonable value of the services. 6 It has been observed that use
of the contract price, notwithstanding proper instructions to the
jury, may result in enforcement of the oral contract itself.2 7 Cer-
tainly, in cases where the promisee has fully performed and the
services are not susceptible of monetary evaluation, the contract
price might well be the only evidence on this subject for the jury to
consider.
Heretofore, the court has been confronted with the situation in
which only two parties were involved-the promisor and the promisee
of the oral contract. In that situation, the only question to be de-
cided is whether the law implies a promise from the promisor to the
promisee to pay the reasonable value of the services. It would never
be contended that payment should go to anyone other than the
promisee who rendered the services, since no other parties are in-
volved. Even if there is a third party beneficiary of the oral con-
tract, this result should not be altered if the terms of the oral con-
tract are excluded from consideration in this determination. But
,once the terms of the oral contract are admitted to show circum-
:stances permitting the inference that the services are to be paid for,
" When the defendant has promised to devise the plaintiff specific property
:in consideration of the services, the value of the property is admissible as
*some indication of what the parties deemed the services to be worth. In
-Grantham v. Grantham, 205 N.C. 363, 171 S.E. 331 (1933), the oral promise
-was to devise and bequeath all the property which the promisor might own at
,her death. The court held the value of the estate to be admissible as some
,evidence, though not conclusive, of the value of the services. Accord, Norton
'v. McLelland, 208 N.C. 137, 179 S.E. 443 (1935); Deal v. Wilson, 178 N.C.(600, 101 S.E. 205 (1919); Faircloth v. Kenlaw, 165 N.C. 228, 81 S.E. 299
(1914). But cf. Doub v. Hauser, 256 N.C. 331, 123 S.E.2d 821 (1962),
where the defendant promised to devise the plaintiff "his share of the farm."
The plaintiff attempted to introduce the value of the defendant's estate as
some evidence of the value of the services rendered. The court held the
evidence inadmissible for this purpose. Accord, Sawyer v. Weskett, 201
N.C. 500, 160 S.E. 575 (1931). Conceivably, had the tendered evidence
been limited to the value of "his share of the farm," it would have been
admissible. See generally ANNOT., 65 A.L.R.2d 945 (1959).
27 "While this rule purports to fix the amount of compensation, it prac-
tically overrules the statute of frauds; since the jury will ordinarily fail to
discriminate between evidence of the contract as an enforceable obligation,
and evidence of the contract to show what reasonable compensation is." 4
PAGE, WILLS § 10.29 (Bowe-Parker rev. 1961). See also 2 CORBIN, CoN-
TRAcTs § 328 (1950).
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should they not also be admitted to show circumstances permitting
the inference that payment is to be made to a third party?
Two writers, in anticipating the question presented, have ex-
pressed conflicting views as to the result achieved in the principal
case. Professor Williston prescribes the view adopted by Pickel-
sirner,8 whereas Professor Corbin apparently approves the decisions
in Redmon and the Kentucky cases.29  Neither writer gives reasons
for his view. It is believed that if the court's announced policy
against enforcing the oral contract is actually realized in the quantum
mneruit situation, the result in the principal case is desirable. But if,
as assumed in Redmon, the court is actually enforcing the oral con-
tract subject only to a limitation on the amount of damages recover-
able, then, perhaps, it is somewhat arbitrary to deny recovery to the
third party beneficiary solely on the ground that she did not render
the services.
WILLIAM E. SHINN, JR.
28 5 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1455A (rev. ed. 1937). The same result
is prescribed by implication in RESTATEmENT, CONTRACTS § 356 (2), comment
b (1932).
"4 Copi.n, CONTRAcTS § 810 n.1 (1951).
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